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BANGLADESH RICE MARKET 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Although global grain prices have declined during 2009, domestic food prices in South Asian 
countries sharply increased in early 2010. For instance, rice prices have increased by 27 
percent in Dhaka, Bangladesh between October 2009 and February 2010. On the other hand, 
rice prices in the international market have decreased by 6 percent between February and 
March 2010 due to increased supply from Vietnam and Thailand (World Bank, 2010). This 
divergence of domestic and international prices is somewhat surprising given the 
presumption that prices of tradable goods of small open economies are supposed to be set in 
between their respective export parity prices and import parity prices. Accordingly domestic 
prices should adjust close to their import parity price levels at least after a brief time period 
required to transport the goods from abroad. How do we explain this price increase in local 
markets? Murshid et al. (2009), for example, concludes  that the recent increases in rice 
prices was not related to domestic production per se and that such price increase might be 
explained by international prices, market forces and other unobservable factors. This implies 
one should closely examine structure of the rice market. We take a broader perspective on the 
issue of recent price increases in the domestic rice market in Bangladesh. The query that 
follows is that: what exactly is the nature of competition at different stages of the domestic 
rice market of Bangladesh? This can be addressed only if we examine the agents, their 
strategies and incentives at different stages of the rice market value chain. The structure of 
rice markets in Bangladesh is generally considered to be competitive (Murshid et al., 2009; 
Minten et al., 2010). However, such conclusion is not based on rigorous assessments of 
incentives and behaviors of diverge groups of agents operating in the market and unless the 
incentives and behaviors of agents at different stages of markets are closely examined, it 
would not be convincing to conclude about the state of competitiveness of the market 
(Timmer et al 1983). Moreover, it is entirely possible that market operates quite 
competitively within one stage, whereas competition is much restricted within another stage. 
Instead of analyzing competition in the entire market as a single entity, it would be 
appropriate to analyze competition in each and every stage of the market. Therefore, this 
study focuses on particular aspects of market competitiveness by explaining incentives and 
behaviors of different agents in the market, particularly those of large firms operating in the 
middle of the rice market supply chain. We have examined pricing decisions and bargaining 
by agents at different stages of the market. We have also studied scope for collusive behavior 
among large firms in setting prices. In addition, we examined the relationships between the 
international prices of rice and the domestic wholesale prices.  
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1.2 Organization of the Paper 
Section 2 provides a brief review of the existing literature on rice markets agents and 
institutions in Bangladesh. Section 3 discusses about the methodology used in the present 
study. Section 4 illustrates the findings of the primary survey conducted in seven major rice 
trading centers of the country. In Section 5, we present the analysis on relationship between 
local and international prices of different varieties of rice.  Summary and conclusions are 
presented in Section 6. Additional background materials are presented in the Appendix.  
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SECTION 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Being a crucially important component of the rural economy of Bangladesh, the food and 
agriculture sector of the country has been extensively researched and analyzed over the years. 
These two policy areas have consistently been considered as a high priority by the 
Government of Bangladesh. Furthermore, food grains – especially rice, is a major staple of 
the Bangladeshi people’s diet, thus food grain supply and price stabilization were key issues 
of overall food security. In retrospect, a very few studies have systematically studied the rice 
market of Bangladesh. Only a handful of past researches have specifically explored different 
agents operating in the paddy-rice trade circuit in Bangladesh (see Chowdhury, 1992; Crow 
and Murshid, 1994; Baulch et al., 1998; Murshid, 2001; Murshid et al., 2009). 1 As concerns 
for food security diminished, the theme eventually received less attention. 
Earlier works focused initially on technology adoption constraints during the Green 
Revolution of the 1970s and 1980s. The subsequent researches emphasized on reforms in 
agriculture and the food system, criticizing the Public Food Distribution System, input and 
output subsidies for farmers, market and trade liberalization. In the mean time, a number of 
studies on market integration were done, primarily focusing on rice markets. Using data from 
1988 to 1996, Baulch et al. (1998) showed that wholesale markets are integrated spatially. 
Citing Baulch et al. (1998), Dorosh et al. (2004) noted that over 80 % of price changes are 
transmitted between pairs of markets within two weeks. Using data from 1989-90 to 1991-92, 
Goletti (1994) also demonstrated that the markets were moderately integrated. A few have 
explored the structure, conduct and performance of the market (e.g. Chowdhury, 1992; 
Baulch et al., 1998). 
All of the spatial integration studies agree that some price transmission exists between Dhaka 
and other major rice markets, i.e. the markets are not totally segmented. Some of the early 
researches (Ravallion 1986, 1987; Chowdhury, 1992) suggest that rice markets in Bangladesh 
were highly competitive. Dorosh (1999) pointed that there were little scope for a small group 
of traders to significantly affect market supply and prices. Contrary results were observed by 
Osmani and Quasem (1990) and Crow and Murshid (1994), however these findings were 
given small attention.  
Chowdhury and Haggblade (2000) mentioned intense competition among the traders and 
suggested that most market participants behaved like competitive profit-makers. Due to 
increased use of HYV, improved infrastructure, less tied credit, more information-efficient 
markets and increasing number of market participants, the competitiveness can only have 
increased. 
Murshid et al. (2009) is one of the recent studies that discuss food insecurity, instability of 
food production and prices, nature of food markets, policies, etc. Referring to previous 
studies (Ravallion, 1986, 1987; Dawson and Dey, 2002), their paper indicates that the 
common perception is that the rice market in Bangladesh is sufficiently competitive, and 
therefore there was little room for public interventions. The authors found that the rice 
                                                        
1 For a broad overview of rice markets see Murshid (2001) and Murshid et al. (2009).  
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markets in Bangladesh were well integrated except for some specific locations. This 
observation contradicts with previous studies which demonstrated that there is limited 
integration in the rice markets. In addition to analyzing local markets, they also compared the 
rice markets of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, and Kolkata, the capital of West Bengal, 
India. They found that the two markets are less than perfectly integrated, implying that the 
markets only partially consider price signals of each other. Moreover, the authors discussed 
the linkages between various market participants involved in the paddy-rice trade circuit in 
Bangladesh, and the marketing margins among the market operators – where they found that 
the growers’ share in the final consumer price was 70% percent and that the shares of market 
operators were evenly distributed in the case of rice markets. They commented that the 
market participants follow the open bargaining method for determining the price during 
transactions. They underscored trust-building and personalized transactions to be the means 
to achieve successful exchange relations. Overall, they noted that markets all over 
Bangladesh are efficient and well functional. 
In a recent study, Minten et al. (2010) discuss the issue of agricultural marketing, price 
stabilization, value chain and international trade. The paper discusses various aspects of the 
food grain market in Bangladesh and mentions that these markets seem to have become well 
integrated over time and space. Hence, the food grain market of Bangladesh function quite 
efficiently in the well connected areas.  The authors comment that the possible reasons are 
large investments in road infrastructure by the government and donor agencies, and wider 
availability of mobile phones. The explanation put forth is that information flows rapidly in 
the markets and food grains flow from surplus to deficit areas whenever the need arises. The 
study also noted that there appears to be little collusion between traders to fix prices, except 
for short periods. A brief note itself, the paper did not elaborate on the later comments. 
Among other recent studies, Chowdhury (2010) confirms the observations of Murshid et al. 
(2009), showing that 74% of the market links demonstrate strong co-integration and the rest 
demonstrate segmentation. Since conclusions reached by most of the past researches are not 
based on rigorous assessments of incentives and behaviors of diverse group of agents 
operating in the market, this study is specifically targeted toward the issue of fundamental 
strengths and weaknesses of “real” markets.  
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SECTION 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Primary Survey 
The first subtheme of the current study examines the market structure and nature of 
competition prevailing in the rice markets of Bangladesh. This part involves a detailed 
exploration of different agents of the overall paddy-rice trade in major rice trading centers of 
Bangladesh using comprehensive questionnaires and key informant interviews (KII).  
Primary data was collected in seven districts, namely Dinajpur, Naogaon, Bogra, Kushtia, 
Jessore, Chittagong and Dhaka. The locations were selected as per previous researches. The 
idea was to study major rice trading hubs of the country so that the overall state of the supply 
chain is reflected. Hence, in addition to the major supply points (Dinajpur, Naogaon, Bogra, 
Kushtia and Jessore), major urban destinations (Chittagong and Dhaka) were also covered. 
The survey plan included growers (the very first node of the supply chain), millers, rice 
aratdars (brokers, also known as commission agents), rice wholesalers and retailers (the last 
point of the chain from whom consumers buy rice)2. Moreover, key community persons of 
selected villages and key informants of surveyed markets were interviewed to gather details 
of rice trading in their respective areas/markets. The survey instruments focused on various 
firm- and market specific information, particularly details of pricing decisions and 
bargaining, employing open ended questions for the large part. Hence, the primary data will 
mostly utilize qualitative analysis. The instruments that were used are described as follows: 
(a)  Enterprise questionnaires (for millers, wholesalers, aratdars and retailers) inquiring 
about firm specific information on ownership, employees, assets, establishment, 
involvements in the business associations (samity), business relations, financing, credit 
situation, suppliers and customers, costs and revenues and details of pricing decisions 
and bargaining. In addition market specific information i.e. market shares, entry and 
exit, exports and imports and storage were also covered. Furthermore, the rice traders 
were asked to recall prices of different rice varieties sold during the last one year at an 
average monthly frequency. This part of the questionnaires was used for quantitative 
assessment of individual firms’ responses to different prices. 
(b)  KII (for millers, wholesalers, aratdars and retailers) in each of the markets 
interviewing knowledgeable paddy/rice traders who have been active in the market for 
at least 5 years in the respective market. The KIIs questioned about market specific 
information such as market shares, entry and exit, exports and imports, storage, 
business financing and details of pricing decisions and bargaining. 
(c)  Farmer questionnaires (for paddy growers) addressing information on agricultural 
land use, paddy/rice crops, business relations, financing, loan situation, customers and 
details of pricing decisions and bargaining. 
                                                        
2 See Murshid et al. (2009) for details of various market operators in the paddy-rice market. 
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(d)  Community questionnaires (for key persons in the surveyed villages) focusing on 
general information on the village/locality, sources of credit in the area, production 
information and distances to/from major destinations/locations. 
(e)  Price List (in each of the surveyed locations) exhibiting local retail and wholesale 
prices of various agricultural products, enterprise and agricultural inputs, cost of 
transporting goods and consumer goods. 
Overall, the survey employed 5 field officers to collect data in the given locations. 5 days 
were needed to survey each district. The distribution of questionnaire in each location is 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Distribution 
District KII 
Enterprise Questionnaires 
Farmer 
Questionnaires 
Community 
Questionnaires 
Prices 
List 
Millers, 
wholesalers and 
aratdars 
Retailers 
Bogra & Naogaon 7 16 - 6 2 3 
Chittagong 10 20 10 - - 5 
Dhaka 9 24 11 - - 4 
Dinajpur 6 16 - 8 2 5 
Jessore 10 20 - - - 5 
Kushtia 10 20 - - - 5 
TOTAL 52 116 21 14 4 27 
 
3.2  Secondary Data 
The second subtheme studies the relationship between the international and the domestic 
wholesale prices of rice as well as examines if domestic prices are dictated by export and 
import parity prices. Secondary data on domestic and international prices of various rice 
varieties, were complied for this purpose.Wholesale prices of major seasonal rice varieties, 
namely, Aman, Aus and Boro including their classifications i.e. coarse, medium and High 
Yielding Variety (HYV) have been collected from DAM’s (Department of Agricultural 
Marketing) records. The local price dataset consists of monthly prices for the years 1997 to 
May 2011. In case of data unavailability for some time periods, linear interpolation was done 
through weighted averages. The different varieties considered are as follows: 
 Aman: coarse, medium, HYV 
 Aus: local, HYV 
 Boro: local, HYV 
Likewise, international rice export prices for the years 2002 to 2011 were collated from 
various issues of Rice Market Monitor, published by FAO(Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations),which provides an analysis of the most recent 
developments in the global rice market. The international price dataset consists of monthly 
prices (in US Dollars per ton, Freight On Board (FOB)) for the period of 1997 to 2011. The 
following varieties were considered: 
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 Thai: 5% broken, 5% parboiled, 25% 
 Vietnamese: 25% 
 Indian: 25% 
 
Note that, for the years 1997 to 1999, the price data were available as yearly averages. In 
order to maintain consistency of the dataset, these yearly averages have been considered as 
the monthly averages for those years. 
All prices were converted to Taka per quintal to ensure comparability. We ensured to analyze 
both nominal and real prices (adjusted for inflation using non-food price index collected from 
Bangladesh Bank). Finally, the trends and volatility of rice prices were examined using time 
series estimation techniques such as descriptive analysis, unit root tests, cointegration tests, 
time series estimation techniques of examining volatility. 
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SECTION 4 
PRIMARY SURVEY ON RICE MARKETS INSTITUTIONS  
This section discusses the first subtheme of the study, namely, examining the market 
structure and nature of competition in the rice markets of Bangladesh. 
The primary survey was conducted during the months of March and April of 2011, covering a 
number of regions within the country. In terms of directions the survey covered the northern, 
western, southern and the central regions (Figure 1). The survey covered three districts in the 
northern region, and these are the districts of Bogra (Dupchanchiya upazilla), Dinajpur 
(Bochaganj and Dinajpur sadar upazillas) and Naogaon (Naogaon sadar upazilla). The 
northern region is major rice producing as well as surplus region, so we covered some of 
these northern regions. In the west the survey covered the districts of Jessore (Abhaynagar, 
Jhikargacha and Sharsha upazillas) and Kushtia (Kushtia sadar upazilla). These areas are 
major hubs of rice marketing chain, and points through which rice imports from India reach 
different destinations. The survey also covered Dhaka and Chittagong metropolitan cities as 
the final consumer location areas. Dhaka is the capital city and Chittagong is a port city from 
which imported rice is transported to all other locations. 
Our objective was to examine the state of competitiveness in different segments of the paddy-
rice market; it was thereby required that we cover the entire supply chain in our primary 
survey. Hence the survey plan included growers (the very first node of the supply chain), 
millers, rice aratdars (brokers, also function as commission agents), rice wholesalers and 
retailers (the last point of the chain from whom consumers buy rice). In addition to studying 
different agents of the chain, the survey included interviews of key informants of selected 
villages and markets to gather details of the paddy-rice production, value addition and trading 
in their respective areas/markets. The survey instruments used were as follows: 
(a) Enterprise Questionnaire (for millers, wholesalers, aratdars and retailers),  
(b) Key Informant Interview (for key informant millers, wholesalers, aratdars and 
retailers), 
(c) Farmer Questionnaire (for paddy growers), 
(d) Community Questionnaire (for key informants in the selected villages), and 
(e) Price List (of different consumer goods, and agricultural and industrial inputs). 
The instruments included various firm and market specific information, particularly details of 
pricing decisions and bargaining. For a systematic discussion, we separately discuss three 
different points of the supply chain; namely, the market for paddy growers, the market for 
millers and wholesalers, and the retail market (see Farid and Rahman (2002) for a detailed 
discussion on the market structure of the rice markets in Bangladesh).   
4.0       Starting Point of Discussion on Market Competitiveness 
A starting point of discussion on market competitiveness can be the idealized, textbook 
version of perfect competition. We can define perfect competition as a market outcome in 
which all firms produce homogenous, perfectly divisible output and face no barriers to entry 
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or exit; producers and consumers have full information, incur no transaction costs, and are 
price takers, and there are no externalities (Carlton and Perloff (2000)). We can examine 
these basic conditions in detail here.  
 
Homogeneous goods:  all firms sell an identical product, and at the same time consumers 
view the products of various firms as the same and are indifferent between them. 
Perfect information: buyers and sellers have all the required information about the market, 
including the price and quality of the product.  
Price taking: buyers and sellers cannot individually influence the price at which the product 
can be purchased or sold.  
No transaction costs: neither buyers nor sellers incur costs or fees to participate in the 
market. 
No externalities: each firm bears the full costs of its production process. This implies, the 
firm does not impose externalities, or uncompensated costs, on others.  
Free entry and exit: firms can enter and exit the market quickly at any time without having to 
incur special expense, this implies, firm does not face barriers to entry or exit.  
Perfect divisibility of output: firms can produce and consumers can buy a small fraction of a 
unit of output. As a result, the amount of output demanded or supplied varies continuously 
with price. This technical assumption avoids problems caused by large discrete changes in 
either supply or demand in response to small price changes.  
 
Few markets in the world would meet the demand of the above definitions of perfect 
competition. Some economists use the term competition to refer to a market in which a few 
price-setting firms compete vigorously for sales. According to this interpretation, competition 
is used to describe rivalry between firms that can affect market price.  
 
We can consider some industries as reasonably competitive if they have certain 
characteristics. Price-taking behavior, many firms and free entry and exit are often used as 
criteria to judge the competitiveness of a market.  
 
From the point of view of public policy, the term competitive implies a market that requires 
no intervention to improve its performance. Yet there are often some confusion regarding the 
usage of this term in public policy since, the failure of a market to satisfy all the assumptions 
of perfect competition does not necessarily mean that some intervention can improve market 
performance (op. cit. (2000)).    
 
We examine components of the rice market in detail, and the wholesaler market in particular, 
to assess deviations of these markets from the perfectly competitive ones (see Section 4.2.24 
for discussion of market structure of the market for wholesalers).  
 
4.1  Market for Paddy Growers 
4.1.1  Examining the State of Competitiveness in the Primary Grower’s Market 
In order to investigate the state of competitiveness in the primary grower’s market, first we 
point out some basic features or testable implications that are expected to be present in this 
segment of the market if it were competitive. First we expect a large number of buyers and 
sellers within this segment, and that no individual agent has control over the market prices. 
This condition is fulfilled in the primary growers’ market segment since there are a very large 
number of sellers (primary growers) and an arguably large number of millers, farias and 
paddy aratdars who function as buyers and sure that no single agent can dictate the market 
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prices. Second we expect free entry and exit. This condition is also met in this segment since 
we do not find any significant barriers for entry into paddy farming or the intermediary 
functions. Third we expect bargains among the agents to settle the price, where no particular 
agent is constrained in any way to settle bargains. Constrained bargaining may lead to 
economic losses for the agent who faces this problem and thereby the opposite party in the 
transaction may gain out of this situation. A market cannot be considered sufficiently 
“competitive” where some agents are faced with restricted bargaining capacity due to 
problems that they face, for example, credit or cash constraints, lack of storage capacity, 
limited information, etc.  It is in the case of this third condition, that we find some problems 
related to competitiveness for the primary grower segment of the rice market. 
4.1.2  Background Discussion of the Selected Villages 
The primary survey covered a total of four villages in two districts. The villages are Harish 
Chandrapur in Bochaganj upazilla and Korimullahpur mohalla within Dinajpur sadar area in 
Dinajpur district; Kadowa and Debipur villages within Naogaon sadar area in Naogaon 
district. Our survey team collected community information from selected key informants, 
verified those with a larger group of audience, and completed face-to-face questionnaire 
interview of a total of fourteen farmers, of medium and small farm holdings. Four farmers in 
Harishchandrapur, four in Korimullahpur, three in Kadowa and three in Debipur participated 
in the interview process. 
The selected villages are located within a five kilometer radius of some of the rice wholesaler 
markets that we have surveyed. We concentrated on only the geographically proximate 
regions of the selected markets. The objective was to investigate primary growers’ market 
within closely located areas and where distance was not a major issue. These survey areas 
were found to be well connected with important locations and establishments such as roads, 
haats and bazaars and are within three to five kilometer distance from union or upazilla 
parishad headquarters, police stations and haat/bazaars. Number of households varied across 
villages-- the highest of 700 in Korimullahpur and lowest of 200 in Debipur and the 
remaining two were around 350. Key informants reported that Bochaganj is the closest main 
upazilla/city/town for Harishchandrapur village, Dinajpur sadar town is the closest for 
Korimullahpur, and Naogaon sadar town for both Kadowa and Debipur villages. Land prices, 
on an average, were TK. 5,000 and TK. 8,000 per decimal in Harishchandrapur and Debipur 
and TK. 27,000 and TK. 24,000 per decimal in Korimullahpur and Kadowa, respectively. 
The differences in land prices might have been associated with gradual expansion of the cities 
into neighboring formerly village locations. All four villages had electricity connections. 
Crop agriculture and daily agricultural wage labor were found to be the two most important 
economic activities of all of them, whereas business/hotel/restaurant activities were 
mentioned in the third place. Mobile phones were mentioned as principal means of 
information communication in all of these places. Rickshaw vans, rickshaws and bicycles 
were mentioned as principal means of physical communication. All of the selected areas had 
some NGO programs currently running, most prominently education and health programs run 
by BRAC, microcredit programs, Barendra Bahumukhi Pani Shech Prokolpa, etc. 
Agricultural credits were available from both NGOs (at 15% nominal interest rate) and Krishi 
Bank (at 10% rate) in two locations, whereas one location (Korimullahpur) mentioned only 
NGOs and the remaining location Harishchandrapur mentioned NGOs, Krishi Bank, 
mohajons (at 20% rate) and Sonali Bank (at 13% rate).  Insurance was also available in these 
locations; common one was life insurance.      
Aman and Boro paddy crops dominated crop agriculture in these villages-- around three-
fourths of all agricultural land was allocated for these crops during the respective crop 
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seasons. The average amount of paddy yields did not differ much among these villages 
either-- the average yield during the Boro season was 64 tons per acre across all villages with 
the highest of 75 in Korimullahpur and the corresponding value for Aman is 37 tons per acre 
with the highest of 45 for Naogaon locations. All the locations reported two-crop lands to be 
the most common ones, followed by three-crop lands, with one-crop lands the least common 
ones. Land tilling was mechanized. More than three-fourths of agricultural land in each of the 
locations was under irrigation. The irrigation method consisted of shallow machines and low 
lift pumps. There were some cases of sharecropping, whereas leasing agreements were also 
available for Aus or Aman or the entire year. Chemical fertilizers were available at the 
prevailing market prices, which did not differ across villages-- urea at TK. 650, M.P. at TK. 
850 and T.S.P. at TK. 1,200 per 50 Kg bag. Hired labor employment became more expensive 
in recent times, as it was reported. Across the surveyed villages, while male agricultural daily 
wage rates (without food) were in the range of TK. 200 to 250 during the peak season, this 
rate was in the range of TK. 150 to 200 during the lean season. The corresponding figures for 
female labor were TK. 100 to 200 for peak season and TK. 80 to 150 for lean season. The 
two villages of Naogaon registered higher wage rates compared to the two villages of 
Dinajpur-- yet the difference is small. 
4.1.3  Profile and Crop Cultivation Records of the Paddy Growers  
In the Dinajpur locations, the four surveyed farmers in the village Harishchandrapur had on 
an average 350 decimals of crop land, three of them are classified as “medium” sized farmers 
and one as a “small” farmer. The four farmers in the village Korimullahpur had an average of 
120 decimals of crop land, three of them were “small” categories and one was a “landless, 
sharecropper” category. On the other hand, in the Naogaon locations, three Kadowa farmers 
had on an average 295 decimals (one “medium” and two “small”) and three Debipur farmers 
had 110 decimals (one “medium”, one “small” and one “marginal”). Thus we surveyed five 
“medium”, seven “small”, one “marginal” and one “landless” category farmers. The median 
amount of crop land owned across the villages is 159 decimals of land-- we understand a 
typical respondent is a “small” farmer. The median amount of homestead land is only 10 
decimals.  
Median age of the surveyed farmers is 53 years and median number of years of schooling is 
only 6 years, with a maximum value of 12 years. All the respondents are male. Farmers have 
reported to be intensely involved in crop agriculture in the months of April, May, and June, 
and again in November, December and January, whereas they involve in other activities 
during the other months. All the four locations have reported to have planted BR 28 and BR 
29 categories of paddy during the last one year, whereas Dinajpur farmers have also reported 
about BR 34 and Naogaon farmers have reported to have planted Jirashail. 
4.1.4  Pricing Decisions as Reported by the Paddy Growers 
The surveyed farmers have reported about both their crop returns and local harvest period 
price of paddy. We find that harvest prices vary across villages, for example, for the same BR 
28 variety paddy, Harishchandrapur farmers reported harvest period prices to be TK. 12.5 per 
kg (cost of production is reported at TK. 8.6 per kg) and Korimullahpur farmers reported TK. 
13 per kg (cost of production at TK. 11.8). We find higher prices in Naogaon villages-- both 
Kadowa and Debipur farmers report TK. 15 (cost of production is TK. 12.5 or less in both 
cases). Harvest period prices to be received by the farmers are settled in the local markets and 
this depends on local demand and supply conditions. We note that each individual grower 
bargains to settle with beparis or farias, so the price they finally settle at depends largely on 
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the individual-level bargain. The surveyed farmers do not have any collective bargaining 
agency or cooperative associations in order to negotiate prices on a collective basis. 
The surveyed farmers reported that returns from crop production was not satisfactory, and 
that they found themselves in disadvantageous position in both of the crop seasons, Aman and 
Boro. In the Boro season, yield amount is high and at the same time production cost is high, 
whereas the harvest period prices are low. On the other hand, in the Aman season, production 
cost is slightly lower, and the harvest period prices are generally slightly higher as compared 
to those of Boro, but yield amount is low.  
The paddy growers have contacts with beparis and farias, and sell paddy to them, most of the 
cases during the harvest period. On an average, a paddy grower has 13 business contacts (the 
maximum value found is 35 and the minimum is only one); these contacts are with bepari, 
miller, paddy aratdar, farias. All the business transactions with them are informal, so 
nowhere there is anything legally documented. The transactions are in both cash and credit. 
Taking credits from millers, beparis or farias is quite common among the paddy growers 
during the crop season, most commonly for purchase of inputs. We find that the number of 
business contacts a paddy grower has is statistically significantly positively associated with 
the amount of his landholdings at 10% significance level (p-value=0.068). This implies a 
larger farmer tends to have larger number of business contacts (and therefore larger set of 
options to choose from) whereas the situation tends to worsen for a small farmer with fewer 
number of business contacts. In addition to that, paddy growers do not have many reliable 
sources of credit, only family or friends, NGOs, mohajons or miller/beparis/farias; they have 
little access to formal banking sources.   
A summary from the farmer questionnaire illustrates the pattern of transactions that takes 
place. In Harishchandrapur, out of 12 cases of crop production, 6 cases were there of more 
than 80% sale immediately after the harvest. In addition to that, 6 cases were there of tied 
transactions-- advances were taken against production expenses. In Korimullahpur, out of 13 
cases, 7 cases were there of immediate sale of more than 80%, and 3 cases of advance credit. 
The Naogaon farmers have reported better records of transactions, out of a total of 15 cases in 
two villages, only one case of immediate sale of more than 80% and 7 cases of advance credit 
being taken implying tied transaction.      
The surveyed farmers reported that beparis and farias visit their places during the harvest 
time and collect samples. Most of these intermediaries are representatives from millers. The 
intermediaries examine the quality of the paddy and then they offer some rates. The rate often 
has a maximum offer, beyond which beparis and farias rarely want to settle. Once the farmer 
agrees, the intermediaries arrange for transport and send it to the miller.  
When asked how the bargaining with farias and beparis are settled, farmers invariably 
mention two points, market price and quality of paddy. Upon closer examination, farmers 
admit that, even though both they and the counterpart intermediaries come up with price 
quotations, invariably this is the price quoted by the intermediaries that matter, not theirs. 
This happens because farmers lack sufficient facilities for storage of paddy; and thus keeping 
paddy for long is most often not a viable option. This implies that the surveyed farmers lack 
bargaining power and have to accept the price that is set by the millers or their 
representatives.  
Even though interconnectedness of the market should have benefitted the farmers as well, the 
survey responses indicate a gloomy scenario where their lack of credit sources, and cash 
constraints as well as lack of storage facilities force them to take suboptimal decisions, i.e., 
selling paddy immediately after the harvest to repay already incurred credits.  
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We can summarize that even though the paddy growers’ segment may look “competitive”, 
the very nature of competitiveness is cast in doubt due to the constrained pattern of 
bargaining on behalf of the primary growers in this segment. 
4.2  Market for Wholesalers  
4.2.1  Examining the State of Competitiveness in the Market for Wholesalers  
In order to investigate the state of competitiveness in the rice wholesaler market, we point out 
some basic features or testable implications that are expected to be present in this market. 
First we point out that a competitive market is one which contains a large number of buyers 
and sellers. Second we can expect free entry and exit of firms into this market. These are the 
minimum requirements in order for the market to be considered competitive. We find that the 
rice wholesaler market easily meets the first condition; that is it covers a large of buyers (end-
point wholesalers or retailers) and sellers (millers, commission agents or wholesalers). With 
regards to the issue of free entry, we find that entry into this market is not free in the sense 
that enterprises that operate in this market segment have long years of operation as 
background and they require solid business contacts with their counterparts. We also find that 
operations in a small rice wholesaler market requires sufficient amount of local knowledge 
and familiarity with the surrounding environment, which a non-local wholesaler enterprise 
most often may not be able to meet. Therefore a local wholesaler market typically covers 
only the local enterprises, not the non-local ones. With regards to price bargaining, we also 
find that larger size enterprises have advantage since their price quotations are often regarded 
as indicative market prices, and smaller enterprises do not have much choice but to follow 
prices quoted by the larger ones. Even though market prices are determined by interactions of 
large numbers of buyers and sellers, it is typically the prices quoted by the larger enterprises 
that dictate the direction of price movements. Here we remind ourselves of price-leadership 
models in the oligopoly market structures (set in a small size market). There are indications 
that the rice wholesaler market segment operates to some extent like a price-leadership 
oligopoly or a dominant firm oligopoly model (we discuss in detail this pattern of behavior in 
some subsections below).   
4.2.2  Breakdown of the Sample Enterprises   
We have covered a total of 116 wholesaler enterprises in our survey over a total of twelve 
rice wholesale markets across seven districts (Table 2). More specifically we covered five 
districts (Bogra, Dinajpur, Jessore, Kushtia and Naogaon) and two metropolitan city areas 
(Dhaka and Chittagong). A total of 52 key informant interviews were also taken to assess the 
state of competitiveness of these twelve markets (here by the term “market”, we mean small 
rice wholesaler centers).   
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TABLE 2 
Distribution of the Sample Enterprises by Districts 
Survey District Upazilla/Sadar KII Wholesaler 
Bogra Dupchanchiya 2 9 
Chittagong Chittagong City Corporation 10 20 
Dhaka 
Babubazaar aka Badamtoli 5 10 
Kochukhet 2 6 
Mohammadpur Krishi Market 2 8 
Dinajpur 
Bochaganj aka Shetabganj 3 6 
Dinajpur Sadar 3 10 
Jessore 
Abhaynagar 5 9 
Jhikargacha 3 5 
Sharsha 2 6 
Kushtia Kushtia Sadar 10 20 
Naogaon Naogaon Sadar 5 7 
Total Bangladesh 52 116 
 
4.2.3  Ownership and Owner Profiles 
A large majority of the sample enterprises (69 percent) are owned by single owners. Of the 
remaining 36 jointly owned enterprises, on an average a total of 2.72 owners own an 
enterprise. The maximum average number of joint owners is found in Chittagong area 
markets, with a number of 3.44 owners per enterprise (maximum value of 6). We see sole 
ownership is most common throughout the country; whereas even when the enterprise is 
jointly owned, the maximum number of owners rarely cross three. 
Out of 179 owners recorded in the wholesaler module, only one is a female. Women are 
rarely found to be involved, even in the form of partnership. Average age of the owners is 44 
years of age, with a maximum value of 48.18 years in Naogaon, and a minimum value of 38 
years in Kushtia. Age of owners varies widely, from a low 24 years to a high 70 years. In 
terms of years of education, the average number of years of education of the owners has been 
found to be 10 years (SSC level). There are four cases where the owners are illiterate and 
thirty cases where the owners are at least graduates. A total of 73 percent of owners have 
completed secondary school certificate level or higher. The average number of years of 
education did not differ much in terms of market locations. We notice that the owners have 
on an average a high number of years of experience in the rice market, the average number is 
15 years. The owners of enterprises of some traditional rice markets such as Dinajpur and 
Naogaon have reported very high number of years of experience in the market, average value 
being 21 years for Dinajpur enterprise owners and 27 years for Naogaon enterprise owners. 
We can infer that long many years of experience in the rice market is a common feature 
among enterprise owners while most of them have completed at least secondary level of 
formal education. 
In terms of occupation before establishing/inheriting the enterprise, a total of 77 owners have 
reported to have been students (43 percent) and an additional 43 owners were involved in 
some other businesses (24 percent). A few of them moved in from other businesses, mostly in 
other related areas. On an average each owner has claimed to have around 64 percent of 
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ownership of the enterprise, with owners of Chittagong recording the lowest of 48 percent 
each and Dinajpur recording the highest of  94 percent each, this matching with the average 
number of owners per enterprise in these areas. When asked whether the owners have 
ownership over some other enterprises, only 11 owners have claimed to have such, whereas 
105 responded in the negative, whilst no response was recorded for the remaining 63 owners. 
4.2.4  Connectedness of the Wholesaler Markets 
In terms of operations of the rice market, the survey locations are intricately connected to 
each other.  Figures 2 to 8 show the major sources and destinations of supply in the surveyed 
districts. 
We consider the case of Dupchanchiya upazilla location in Bogra district, for example. The 
major supplier locations for this market are Bogra (own and other upazillas), Dinajpur, 
Gaibandha, Joypurhat, Naogaon, Netrokona, Porsha, Rangpur, Shapahar and Sirajganj. On 
the other hand, the major destination locations are Comilla, Chittagong, Dhaka, Feni, 
Gazipur, Savar, Munshiganj and Narayanganj. Thereby even a small rice center like 
Dupchanchiya operates as a collection point in the northern region and it sends rice to all the 
major rice demand locations in the country.  As for another example we consider the case of 
rice centers in the Chittagong metropolitan area. Rice reaches Chittagong wholesale centers 
from a large number of locations such as Naogaon, Ashuganj, Brahman Baria, Bogra, Chapai 
Nawabganj, Dinajpur, Gaibandha, Habiganj, Jamalpur, Kishoreganj, Mymensingh, 
Narsingdi, Pabna, Rajshahi, Syedpur, Sherpur, Sirajganj, Sylhet and Thakurgaon. 
Consequently rice is distributed to all the upazillas of Chittagong, Cox’s Bazaar, 
Khagrachari, Bandarban and Rangamati from these centers. Some rice is also transported to 
Sylhet, particularly the imported atap (non-parboiled) rice which is demanded only in 
Chittagong and Sylhet districts of the country. Thus the rice centers in Chittagong 
metropolitan area are major locations for rice demand which collects rice from all over the 
country and then forwards it to all the smaller locations within greater Chittagong and 
Chittagong Hill Tracts districts. Another point to notice is that connections between rice 
centers are sometimes two-way, not always unidirectional. For example rice is transported 
from Sylhet to Chittagong and at the same time rice is also transported from Chittagong to 
Sylhet. The rice wholesaler locations within Dhaka metropolitan area have reported to 
receive most of their supplies from mostly the northern locations such as Bogra, Dinajpur, 
Gaibandha, Chapai Nawabganj, Pabna, Natore and Naogaon, western locations such as 
Jessore and Kushtia, and locations in the nearby districts such as Tangail, Jamalpur, 
Mymensingh and Sherpur. 
We have found that all the rice centers throughout the country have become heavily 
interconnected by this time and this has become possible due to the rapidly expanding mobile 
phone network and increasingly developed road transportation. The Jamuna Bridge has been 
instrumental in bringing the northern regions into close communication with the capital city 
of Dhaka, and other major rice demand centers – particularly Chittagong. 
4.2.5  Size of the Wholesaler Markets 
The survey locations clearly differ in terms of number of enterprises operating there (Table 
3). The rice wholesale markets studied in Dinajpur sadar (Dinajpur) and Kushtia sadar 
(Kushtia) are very large; around 250 enterprises or more in each of these locations. Compared 
to these, markets located at Dupchanchiya (Bogra), Jhikargacha (Jessore) and Sharsha 
(Jessore) are very small, with number of enterprises less than 20.  
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We propose to categorize markets with more than 200 enterprises as “large” markets, with in 
between 40 to 200 enterprises as “medium” sized markets and with less than 40 enterprises as 
“small” sized markets. According to this categorization it turns out that we have covered four 
“large” markets, three “medium” markets as well as five “small” markets. On the other hand 
we have used indicators for the size of enterprises, such as “large”, “medium” and the 
“small” (this is based on each respondent’s self-reported assessment of the size of his 
respective enterprise as compared to the other enterprises within the same market). Within the 
surveyed rice markets, on an average, around 20 percent of enterprises classified themselves 
as “large”, 35 percent as “medium” and the remaining 45 percent as “small” enterprises. 
 
TABLE 3 
Census Information of the Surveyed Rice Markets 
District Market 
Types of 
Trade 
Wholesale/arat 
= 1 Import = 2 
Retail = 3 
Milling = 4 
No. of Rice 
Trading 
Enterprises 
and Market 
Size 
No. of Enterprises by 
Size 
Large Medium Small 
Bogra C.O. Office Road Bazaar 1 15 (Small) 5 4 6 
Chittagong Chaktai Bazaar 1, 3 275 (Large) 60 115 100 
 Shah Amanat Bazaar (Bera Bazaar) 3 18 (Small) 5 7 6 
 Bohoddarhat Bazaar 3 12 (Small) 3 4 5 
Dhaka Ray Shaheb Bazaar 3 10 (Small) 2 2 6 
 Babubazaar (Badamtoli) 1, 3 280 (Large) 90 140 50 
 Kochukhet Rajanigandha Market 1, 3 72 (Medium) 15 25 32 
 Mohammadpur Krishi Market 1, 3 180 (Medium) 40 90 50 
Dinajpur Pulhat Bazaar 1 70 (Medium) 20 30 20 
Jessore Benapole Bazaar 1, 3 4 (Small) 2 2  
 Jhikargacha Bazaar 1 9 (Small) 2 3 4 
 Navaron Bazaar (Sharsha) 1, 3, 4 6 (Small) 2 2 2 
 Nowapara Bazaar (Abhaynagar) 1, 4 24 (Small) 6 8 10 
Kushtia Khajanagar 1, 4 310 (Large) 10 30 270 
Naogaon Par Naogaon 1, 3 82 (Medium) 10 20 52 
All Markets - 1367 272 482 613 
 
4.2.6  International Trade in the Wholesaler Markets 
Private imports have dried up in the rice centers in recent years. None of the seven survey 
locations has any current transaction in the international markets. Only the Chittagong traders 
have reported to be taking preparations for selling some small amount of imported rice that 
was a part of assignment shipped late, but no recent import during the last one year or so. 
They mentioned about imported varieties from Vietnam, Pakistan, Myanmar and Thailand. 
Imported varieties from these countries, according to them, are of lower quality compared to 
local varieties, usually cheaper by Taka 3 or 4 per kilogram of rice, and are generally 
purchased by lower income households. Naogaon traders mentioned a number of rice 
varieties from India and their opinion is the same, i.e. the imported varieties are of inferior 
quality and sold at around Taka 3 or 4 per kilogram less than the local varieties. It takes about 
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a month or two to import by rail, whereas by road (trucks) it takes around 10 to 15 days. 
Since the current gap between prices of local varieties and international varieties is not much 
high, the traders do not have incentives to obtain Letters of Credit (LC) for importing rice 
from the international market as the profit margin is not significant.  
4.2.7  Entry and Exit of Enterprises in the Wholesaler Markets 
A number of rice wholesaler markets are relatively old, with enterprises’ establishments 
dating back to the 1950s. Entry is continuing in all the locations till this point of time. Some 
markets such as Chittagong City Corporation areas have been quite active, with as many as 
40 firms entering and another 35 firms exiting during the last 5 years. On the other hand, 
some locations such as Dupchanchiya have actually seen a reduction in market size with five 
firms exiting during the last 5 years. 
 
TABLE 4 
Oldest and newest enterprises, entry and exit 
District/City Upazilla Oldest 
Enterprise 
Newest 
Enterprise 
Entry –last 5 
yrs 
Exit –last 5 
yrs 
Bogra Dupchanchiya 1980 n.a. 0 5 
Chittagong Chittagong City Corporation 1970 2009 40 35 
Dhaka Babubazaar aka Badamtoli 1950 2011 35 32 
  Kochukhet 1978 2009 4 2 
  Mohammadpur Krishi Market 1984 2010 25 20 
Dinajpur Bochaganj aka Shetabganj 1950 2008 4 3 
Dinajpur Sadar 1965 2009 35 0 
Jessore Abhaynagar 1960 2010 4 2 
Jhikargacha 1961 2010 1 0 
Sharsha   1980 2010 1 1 
Kushtia Kushtia Sadar 1978 2010 30 0 
Naogaon Naogaon Sadar 1962 2008 7 4 
 
With regards to the question of whether entry into rice wholesale markets is difficult or not, 
most key informants from different markets have mentioned moderate level of difficulty 
involved in the process. The difficulty on behalf of a potential entrant is that entry into this 
market requires a large amount of financial capital and sufficient knowledge as well as 
experience in this particular trade. In some large markets, particularly in the major locations 
such as Chittagong and Dhaka, it is difficult to get suitable space for establishing the shop as 
some of these market locations are already crowded. An additional requirement for entry into 
this market is that the potential entrant enterprise needs to have contacts with a large number 
of potential clients or business partners. Often this implies that outside the metropolitan 
cities, only the local businessmen are found to be interested in setting up rice wholesale 
centers. It is considered very difficult and quite unlikely for a non-local businessman to start 
operations in a small rice market like Dupchanchiya and become successful because 
eventually, he must have widespread connections and business relations within the 
surrounding area, this the non-local one may not have.  
With regards to the question of whether there were cases of exit from the markets; most of 
the key informants of the respective rice trading centers cited cases of exit during the last 5 
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years. Frequency of exits differs in the different surveyed locations. For example, Kushtia is a 
large sized market that did not register any cases of exit, while Dupchanchiya is a small sized 
market that registered five cases of exits along with zero cases of entry. This implies that 
markets themselves are evolving continuously at varying magnitudes of entry and exit. 
Defaults in credit transactions were pointed out to be the single most important reason for 
exit. 
Rice wholesalers often operate as commission agents who act as an intermediary between 
rice millers and end-point wholesalers and/or retail wholesalers. As commission agents, the 
rice wholesaler often undertakes transactions on behalf of the millers on to the final-point 
wholesalers. Sometimes, on the basis of intermediary role played by the commission agent-
cum-wholesaler, the miller sends the agreed upon rice stock to the final-point wholesaler, and 
obtains the money from the commission agent within some specified period of time. Hence, 
the commission agent expects to receive payments from the final-point wholesaler. However, 
contracts between these two parties are often verbal or small note-based, not legally 
documented. Sometimes, the final-point wholesaler delay payments to the commission agent, 
and in extreme situations, they completely failed to make the agreed upon payments. Thus, 
most of the cases of exit in the surveyed markets were due to this kind of default in 
transactions, as reported by the key informants.  
4.2.8  Market Shares of Enterprises in the Wholesaler Market 
Through the KII module, the key informants of different rice wholesale centers were asked to 
list the names of enterprises that had had the largest market shares in their respective local 
markets at different points in time during the last five years. Key informants of the same 
markets mentioned the same enterprises in most of the cases. Interestingly, the (perceived) 
market shares of the enterprises at different points in time as mentioned by the key 
informants closely match with each other. This implies that in any market, there is a common 
perception of market leaders in terms of market shares and changes in the shares over time. 
We find that the names of top market share-holding enterprises do not change much and the 
market shares of these enterprises do not exhibit wide fluctuations either. In some of the 
markets the market shares of the top one or two enterprises have actually slightly increased 
over the last five year period, according to the perceived calculations by the key informants. 
There is no single case where a new entrant has taken control of a large market share; 
likewise, there is no case that the oldest establishments have been able to control the largest 
market share. A plausible explanation for this may be that the enterprises do not differ much 
in terms of technology, management or marketing techniques. Inquired about why the leading 
enterprises have been able to enjoy large market shares, the common response was that these 
enterprises have a broader client base and a larger long-term reputation in the market, and at 
the same time have huge financial resources that absorb most kinds of shocks, particularly 
cases of default in transactions. 
4.2.9  Business Associations in the Wholesaler Markets 
Every market has a business association (bazaar samity) and membership of the association 
is a must for running the business operations in the market. According to the responses 
provided by the key informants, the samity has some guardianship role in the affairs of the 
business enterprises. The member enterprises have to pay some regular fees to the samity. 
The samity is expected to mediate in any disputes among its members, or disputes between its 
members and other outside parties. The member enterprises have to abide by some common 
business ethics, such as fairness in weighting of the rice transacted and respecting the 
business contracts. The samity notifies members of recent changes in the government rules 
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and regulations and may discuss causes of grievances with concerned government officials on 
behalf of its members. The samity takes required steps in ensuring security of all its members 
and faces any law and order situation in the market with the help of the law enforcing 
agencies. In some of the markets, the samity provides credit facilities to its members. Another 
very important role of the samity is to set the agency fee of the commission agents based on a 
consensus among all the member enterprises, i.e. the fee is fixed for all the wholesalers 
within a particular market. The key informants have mentioned that the samity does not 
involve itself in specifics of contracts between parties and does not dictate pricing decisions 
or bargaining to its members. It is only interested in upholding the sanctity of the contract 
once this has been agreed upon. 
4.2.10  Financing of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
According to the responses of key informants, the key sources of funding for investment in 
the rice wholesale market are family savings, investments from business profits, remittances, 
nationalized and private commercial banks, informal borrowing from friends and relatives 
and cooperatives, etc. Loans from banks used to be easily available for a long time until very 
recent times. Respondents mentioned that the banks are currently reluctant to give out loans 
as they are suffering from liquidity crisis. 
4.2.11 Storage Capacities of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
According to the responses of key informants, wholesalers in general do not have large 
storage facilities, and this observation applies to all markets across the country in general. 
Some enterprises have small storage facilities, designed for keeping the rice procured for 
short periods of time. The rice wholesalers work mostly as commission agents, connecting 
suppliers (millers) with demanders (end-point wholesalers or retail wholesalers). The 
transactions involve contracts in the form of verbal communication and write-up on small 
notes, and on this basis the shipment is done from the point of the supplier to the point of the 
demander. Therefore, the commission agent does not require large storage space since actual 
rice supply does not reach him at any stage of the transaction. Only in the case of large cities 
like Chittagong, the wholesalers have additional storage facilities since they have multiple 
roles of commission agents, traditional wholesalers and in some cases importers. Thus, they 
require added storage space to store the procured rice. 
4.2.12  Pricing and Bargaining in the Wholesaler Markets 
Wholesaler enterprises covered in the survey mostly function as “commission agents” in the 
market, and in some cases they operate as “wholesalers”. As commission agents, their role is 
to bridge millers to rice wholesalers and/or retailers at the end point. The basic steps involved 
within this bridge that lead to the price being set are described as follows. 
The miller sends specifications of the rice and a reservation level of price is quoted to the 
wholesaler (commission agent). The price quotation is set on the basis of different costs such 
as paddy procuring costs, cost of transforming paddy into rice, storage and other additional 
costs, and agency fee of the commission agent. This agency fee in the rice markets is set by 
the samity based on a consensus among all the member enterprises. Hence, the fee is fixed for 
all the wholesalers within a particular market. Agency fees usually vary in different rice 
markets. Interestingly, the commission agent charges a fee on both suppliers (the millers) and 
buyers (wholesalers at the end point of the market). 
As the commission agent is informed of the miller’s quoted price (which already includes his 
fee from the miller), he adds his fee (to be taken from his buyers) and then bargains with the 
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retail wholesalers, keeping in mind the existing market prices. The commission agent tries to 
obtain a price which will be at least equal to the miller’s quoted price and his fee. Meanwhile, 
representatives of the buyers would want to purchase rice at the lowest possible price given 
the quotations from the commission agent. Once the bargain is over, the commission agent 
writes a hand-written invoice and informs the miller of the transaction. Accordingly, the 
miller arranges the transport and sends the quoted amount of goods to the destination. 
An important point to note, the commission agent always gets his agency fees from both the 
parties that he connects. In any case, if the price bargained minus and agency fee (charged on 
retail wholesalers) is higher or lower than the miller’s quoted price, the miller receives the 
lower/extra revenue. Since the bargained price always depends on existing market prices, the 
commission agent eventually shifts the price burden on to the miller. 
Once the goods have been supplied, the retail wholesaler is required to transfer money to the 
commission agent, and simultaneously, the commission agent is required to transfer money to 
the miller. Therefore, the miller holds the commission agent accountable, staying out of the 
transaction relation with the retail wholesalers. Here lies the risky part of the commission 
agent’s job. It normally takes quite a long time for the commission agent to acquire all 
outstanding sales. In a worst case scenario, the buyer can also default his payments. 
Lastly, the retail wholesaler procures rice from the miller, stores it and sells it over time. 
Therefore, he requires storage space. The retail wholesaler bears all the price risk of the rice 
procured. The survey found some enterprises operating as both commission agents as retail 
wholesalers. 
4.2.13  Overall Market Trends in the Wholesaler Markers 
Key informants in small markets such as Dupchanchiya have reported that business situations 
have been quite the same during the last five years even if some enterprises have shut down 
their businesses. On the other hand, informants in large markets such as Chittagong have 
reported expansion of business activities in their areas during the last five years. There 
appears to be large changes that are taking place in the rice markets in terms of operations. 
While some markets are actually shrinking, others are rapidly expanding. The informants 
from the declining markets mentioned credit default, and establishment and development of 
newer markets in more suitable locations to be the main reasons. The informants from 
expanding markets reported increases in demand caused by growing population, increases in 
supply due to newer entrants of the market. Some informants in the expanding markets deem 
the market to be quite unstable in recent times, with high number of entry and exit of 
enterprises, rapid improvements in communication, etc. Some key informants mentioned that 
the government’s Open Market Sales (OMS) operations have often dampened prices of 
coarse rice in the market and this adversely affected their profitability. 
Informants from all survey locations have mentioned that transport and communication 
facilities have improved. Rice now flows much more smoothly from large rice trading centers 
to the smaller markets. A truckload of rice can reach any union level market without 
interruption or stoppages in district levels. Two most prominent factors for this change are 
developments of roads and rapid expansion of mobile phone technology. With improvements 
in road transport, the entire country has now come under the vast network of the millers and 
wholesalers, and this has increased the number of available options of selling for any miller 
or wholesaler. With advances in communication, in many cases the millers now-a-days 
communicate directly with the end-point or retail wholesalers in order to avoid expenses of 
the third-party commission agents. 
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In terms of technology, the milling technology is also changing and nowadays, auto rice mills 
are attracting a lot of attention. One important aspect of auto rice mills is that the quality of 
rice can be strictly maintained, and this is the reason that rice from these mills are becoming 
more and more popular among the consumers. Auto rice mills involve large amounts of input 
and output to be placed in comparison with other types of rice mills. Therefore, strong and 
stable network of paddy suppliers and rice demanders is necessary. Nowadays, auto rice mill 
owners tend not to depend entirely on wholesalers (commission agents) for marketing. 
Instead, they send their own personnel as sales agents to large markets such as Dhaka, 
Chittagong and Sylhet to bargain and negotiate with retail wholesalers. 
There has not been much activity in the areas of private rice imports during the last three or 
four years, as stated by the respondents. The explanation is that prices in the international 
markets were high and there was not much of a gap between domestic and international rice 
prices to encourage private import. It appears that private import of rice gets into prominence 
only during times of high deficit of domestic rice supply. The informants reflected that the 
imported rice from India, Pakistan (non-Basmati), Thailand, Vietnam and Myanmar are 
generally considered inferior in quality and are sold at Taka 3 or 4 per kilogram less than the 
domestic varieties. 
4.2.14  Basic Features of Enterprises in the Wholesaler Markets 
Table 5 exhibits basic features of the sample enterprises in the wholesaler module. We notice 
that our sample of 116 wholesaler entries consists of 9 “large” enterprises, 56 “medium” 
enterprises and the remaining 51 “small” enterprises. This classification is based on the 
enterprises’ assessment of their respective size compared to that of other enterprises in the 
market. Thus, “medium” and “small” enterprises together comprise more than 90 percent of 
the sample observations, whereas “large” ones comprise the remaining. In terms of type of 
enterprise, around 30 percent of the total sample enterprises claimed themselves to be only 
commission agents, 21 percent claimed themselves to be only wholesalers and an additional 
31 percent claimed themselves to be both commission agents as well as wholesalers. Most of 
the remaining 18 percent of sample observations claimed themselves to be millers. Miller 
enterprises sample have been covered in three locations namely Jessore, Kushtia and 
Naogaon. The distribution of wholesalers and commission agents are evenly spread out 
throughout the country. Road transport network have been found to be favorable for the 
sample enterprises as all of them are within 1 km distance from the main road. 
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TABLE 5 
Basic features of the sample enterprises 
District 
Sample 
Size 
Basic features of the sample enterprises 
Size of Enterprises 
Type and Number of Enterprises 
Large Medium Small 
Bogra 9 1 4 4 Wholesaler 4 
     Commission Agent 5 
Chittagong 20 0 12 8 Wholesaler 8 
     Commission Agent 6 
     Wholesaler and Commission Agent 6 
Dhaka 24 1 14 9 Wholesaler 7 
     Commission Agent 9 
     Wholesaler and Commission Agent 8 
Dinajpur 16 1 5 10 Commission Agent 8 
     Wholesaler and Commission Agent 8 
Jessore 20 2 10 8 Wholesaler 4 
     Commission Agent 2 
     Wholesaler and Commission Agent 9 
     Wholesaler and Retailer 3 
     Miller, Wholesaler and Commission 
Agent 
1 
     Miller and Wholesaler 1 
Kushtia 20 1 10 9 Miller 1 
     Miller and Commission Agent 3 
     Commission Agent 1 
     Wholesaler and Commission Agent 5 
     Miller, Wholesaler and Commission 
Agent 
3 
     Miller and Wholesaler 7 
Naogaon 7 3 1 3 Miller 2 
     Wholesaler 1 
     Commission Agent 4 
 
4.2.15  Employment Aspects of Wholesaler Enterprises 
Rice wholesale enterprises exhibit some common patterns of employment across the country. 
A typical rice wholesale enterprise would have one manager and some assistants as monthly 
paid employees, and a number of laborers would be associated with it most commonly on a 
daily wage basis, not necessarily on a regular payroll. Enterprises that function as only 
commission agents require very few regular staff other than the manager himself. Then again 
enterprises with dual function as wholesaler as well as commission agent require some more 
regular staff. Employment is more in numbers and more in terms of job descriptions in the 
case of the enterprises which have multiple roles of millers as well as commission agents or 
wholesalers. We find that enterprises in more prominent rice markets such as in Kushtia and 
Naogaon have on an average more number of regular staff, manager’s average salary 
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expenses, manager’s salary range, average number of laborers, ranges of average daily wage 
rates of laborers. This finding is expected since these are the major locations that supply rice 
to all over the country and the enterprises of these locations have correspondingly more 
diversified job requirements compared to that of the other areas. We also note that some of 
the sample enterprises in Kushtia and Naogaon are actually millers as well as wholesalers that 
have networks throughout the country. 
The areas do not differ much in terms of average daily wage rates the enterprises offer to 
their laborers, except for Jessore where the rate is much lower. Employment is one indication 
of the size of the firm, and so we can infer that enterprises in Kushtia and Naogaon may be 
considered to be larger compared to other enterprises in other parts of the country. In these 
locations, enterprises often employ accountants, mechanics and marketing managers on a 
regular payroll in addition to regular managers (Table 6). 
TABLE 6 
Employment Features in the Sample Enterprises 
District 
Average No. of 
Regular Staff 
Managers' 
Average Salary 
(Tk.) 
Managers' 
Salary Range 
(Tk.) 
Average No. 
of Laborers 
Average Daily 
Wage Rate 
(Tk.) 
Average Daily 
Wage Rate 
Range (Tk.) 
Bogra 2 4 571 3,000 to 6,000 6.88 200 150 to 250 
Chittagong 1.85 4 632 2,500 to 8,000 3.89 182 100 to 250 
Dhaka 1.83 5 905 2,500 to 8,000 2.14 212 100 to 300 
Dinajpur 2.88 5 255 3,500 to 10,000 7.5 200 150 to 250 
Jessore 2.4 5 136 2,500 to 10,000 3.67 123 50 to 200 
Kushtia 4.75 6 340 2,500 to 10,000 15.46 191 50 to 200 
Naogaon 3.86 10 500 4,000 to 28,000 8.29 229 200 to 300 
 
4.2.16  Physical Assets and Transport Facilities of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
We collected information on physical assets of the enterprises in the wholesaler module. As 
expected, office and storage space is relatively smaller for city locations as in Dhaka and 
Chittagong because of higher costs and these locations are more of end-point nodes of the 
rice market supply chain. On the other hand, Kushtia and Naogaon enterprises have large 
storage spaces since some of them are millers as well as wholesalers and so send supplies to 
all over the country. 
TABLE 7 
Office and Storage Space of the Sample Wholesaler Enterprises 
District Number of Sample Enterprises 
Median Shop/Office 
Space (Sq. Ft.) 
Median Storage 
Space (Sq. Ft.) 
Median Storage 
Capacity (M. Ton) 
Bogra 9 140 1,125 40 
Chittagong 20 90 450 38 
Dhaka 24 108 275 39 
Dinajpur 16 195 900 150 
Jessore 20 285 600 20 
Kushtia 20 168 2,800 150 
Naogaon 7 200 2,000 300 
Total 116 180 700 50 
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Some of the sample enterprises have transport facilities (owned or rented) and the rest do not 
have any. None of the enterprises located in the Dhaka and Chittagong metropolitan areas 
claimed to have any transport facilities, this matching with their role as end-point of the rice 
market supply chain. Their business counterparts take the responsibility of sending the 
ordered rice supply and therefore, they do not need transport facilities themselves. We notice 
that within the entire rice market in the country, enterprises in some locations in the northern 
and western areas (such as Kushtia and Naogaon) are particularly prominent in terms of 
storage space and capacity, actual capacity of transport facilities available, etc. 
TABLE 8 
Transport Facilities of the Sample Wholesaler Enterprises 
District 
Number of  
Enterprise 
Has Vehicle? 
Type of Vehicle 
Median Carrying 
Capacity (M. Ton) 
Median Actual 
Capacity (M. Ton) Yes No 
Bogra 9 6 3 Truck 14 5 
Chittagong 20 0 20 - - - 
Dhaka 24 0 24 - - - 
Dinajpur 16 1 15 Truck 14 5 
Jessore 20 3 17 Truck 8 5 
Kushtia 20 12 8 Truck 20 14.5 
Naogaon 7 2 5 Truck 10 9.5 
Total 116 24 92 - 15 9.75 
 
4.2.17  Establishment of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
The sample wholesale enterprises have documented long years of stay in the rice business 
since the average number of years of stay in business is 15.72 years. There is not much of a 
difference in terms of locations regarding this issue except for the northern location of 
Naogaon, where the average years of stay are around 24 years. Most of the sample enterprises 
have been newly started, whereas some more prominent rice markets such as Kushtia and 
Naogaon, the tendency to inherit the business is slightly higher (Table 9). In terms of sources 
of financing, owners’ own savings from non-agricultural activities have been most commonly 
cited as major source of funds, and this is evident throughout the country. Remittances, sale 
of assets, borrowing from family and friends, loans from private commercial banks have been 
cited as other sources of funds in some cases. The median value of costs of establishment in 
the whole sample is reported as TK. 0.45 million (nominal values reported for the year of 
establishment, not converted into current values). Cost of entry into this rice wholesale 
market can be considered reasonably high. 
TABLE 9 
Years of Stay in Business of the Sample Wholesaler Enterprises 
District Number of Enterprise 
How Established? Average Years of 
Stay in Business Newly Started Inherited 
Bogra 9 5 4 15.22 
Chittagong 20 16 4 13.2 
Dhaka 24 19 5 15 
Dinajpur 16 12 4 19.63 
Jessore 20 18 2 15.85 
Kushtia 20 12 8 12.7 
Naogaon 7 3 4 23.86 
Total 116 85 31 15.72 
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4.2.18  Business Contacts of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
We find that the rice wholesale market is intricately interconnected and this has been helped 
by widespread use of mobile phones. Rice wholesalers have business contacts with other 
businesses, and the addresses often cover the entire area of the country. This is more 
prominent in the case of the northern wholesale markets (Table 10). For example, an 
enterprise in Naogaon has on an average business contacts with 22.5 numbers of millers, 
19.17 numbers of other wholesalers and 14.25 numbers of paddy aratdars. The addresses of 
these business contacts include some nearby locations as well as the other corners of the 
country, such as Sylhet, Chittagong, and even Cox’s Bazaar. We find some pattern in this set 
of information, such as enterprises in Bogra, Dinajpur, Jessore, Kushtia and Naogaon have 
strong business connections with rice centers in Dhaka and surrounding areas, and at the 
same time they keep connections with centers in Chittagong, Sylhet, Barisal, Khulna, 
Mymensingh and other locations. Therefore even though the main channel of domestic rice 
supply is from the Northern areas to the central areas such as Dhaka, this is not the only 
option left for the Northern area enterprises. The rice centers of Dhaka and surrounding areas 
have to compete with Chittagong and Sylhet rice centers in terms of price offers and any time 
their offers are lower compared to others, the Northern area wholesalers would send rice 
supply to those other areas instead. These large number of business contacts indicate that 
there may be intense competitions in terms of price offers and bargaining among wholesalers 
in different locations as well as within the same location. Another interesting feature is that 
all the contracts are informal, and there is nowhere any legal, written document in the entire 
rice market. Therefore “trust” and “reputation” play important role in day-to-day business 
transactions, whereas default risk is always present in this environment. Transactions are 
done both in cash and credit, yet credit transactions are more common. 
 
TABLE 10 
Business Contacts of Sample Wholesale Enterprises 
District 
Type of Business 
Partner 
Average 
Number 
Contract 
Formal? 
(Yes/No) 
Most Common Locations of Business 
Partners 
Bogra Miller 15 No Dhaka, Savar, Gazipur, Feni, 
  Other Wholesalers 13.33 No Rangpur and local areas of 
  Paddy Aratdar 7.6 No Bogra 
Chittagong Local Retailers 20.21 No Naogaon, Dinajpur, Habiganj,  
  Other Retailers 14.67 No Ashuganj, Kashba, Brahmanbaria,  
  Local Wholesalers 14.06 No Netrokona, Mymensingh, Bogra,  
  Rice Aratdar 7.86 No and local areas of Chittagong,  
  Miller 7.5 No Cox's Bazaar, Bandarban, Rangamati  
  Other Wholesalers 6.33 No and Khagrachari districts 
Dhaka  Local Wholesalers 33.44 No Naogaon, Sherpur, Kushtia, Dinajpur,  
  Local Retailers 31.52 No Chapai Nawabganj, Bogra, Sherpur, 
  Miller 13.79 No Mymensingh, Brahmanbaria, Ashuganj,  
  Other Wholesalers 10.4 No Comilla, all local areas of Dhaka city 
  Other Retailers 8.4 No and surrounding districts 
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Dinajpur Miller 23.2 No Dhaka, Narsingdi, Ghorashal,  
  Local Retailers 16 No Chittagong, Tangail, Sylhet, Chandpur,  
  
Local/Other 
Wholesalers 
7 No Feni, Noakhali, Faridpur, Khulna,  
  Paddy Aratdar 5.33 No and local areas of Dinajpur  
Jessore Paddy Aratdar 22 No Dhaka, Faridpur, Madaripur,  
  Miller 15.55 No Noakhali, Comilla, Chandpur, Chittagong,  
  Local Retailers 14.55 No Munshiganj, Barisal, Rangpur, Khulna 
  Other Wholesalers 12.93 No and local areas of Jessore 
  Local Wholesalers 9.44 No   
Kushtia Miller 25.07 No Jessore, Bogra, Natore, Dinajpur, Dhaka,  
  Paddy Aratdar 18.73 No Barisal, Faridpur, Sylhet, Comilla,  
  Other Wholesalers 28.47 No Munshiganj, Madaripur, Narayanganj,  
  Local Wholesalers 11.29 No and all local areas of Kushtia 
  Local Retailers 4.86 No   
Naogaon Miller 22.5 No Dhaka, Sylhet, Chittagong, Comilla,  
  Other Wholesalers 19.17 No Dinajpur, Khulna, Mymensingh,  
  Paddy Aratdar 14.25 No Noakhali, Cox's Bazaar and local areas 
 
4.2.19  Financing of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
In terms of sources of fund for working capital, all enterprises in Bogra area mentioned 
public commercial banks, and one enterprise mentioned taking loans from informal money 
lenders. Credit transactions with miller and other wholesalers are also reported to be 
widespread in the rice markets of Bogra. Chittagong rice market enterprises mentioned re-
investments as the main source of fund for working capital. Dhaka rice market enterprises 
were evenly split in their responses as nearly half of them mentioned re-investment from own 
business, most of the remaining ones mentioned private commercial banks, and a few 
enterprises mentioned public commercial banks. Out of 16 sample enterprises in Dinajpur, 8 
mentioned private commercial banks and 6 mentioned public commercial banks as sources of 
funds for working capital. We find similar breakdown for other areas, such that around two-
thirds of the sample enterprises take loans from private commercial banks and around one-
third take loans from public commercial banks. All of the sample enterprises mentioned 
credit transactions and/or loans taken from business partners, most commonly from millers 
and other wholesalers.  
The sample enterprises have reported how much loans they can raise from the market and 
whether they have some outstanding loans at the moment (Table 11). Comparing with other 
aspects of the market, we notice that enterprises from Kushtia and Naogaon have reported 
higher amounts that they would be able to collect from the market. The amount of 
outstanding loan is also higher for these enterprises. 
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TABLE 11 
Loan Situation of the Sample Wholesale Enterprises 
District 
No. of 
Enterprises 
Average maximum amount of credit that can 
be taken for (Tk.) 
Current 
Loan? 
(Yes) 
Average 
Current Loan 
Amount 
Interest Rates 
Working capital Investment purposes 
Bogra 9 1,088,125 1,125,000 5 2,400,000 12.5, 13 
Chittagong 20 1,235,000 2,735,000 2 1,030,000 13,15 
Dhaka 24 2,816,667 2,883,333 11 1,638,182 14,13,16 
Dinajpur 16 4,193,750 4,328,125 2 4,000,000 13,14,15,16 
Jessore 20 2,496,000 6,437,500 4 2,317,500 13,14,15,16 
Kushtia 20 15,257,895 36,657,895 3 2,793,333 13,14,16 
Naogaon 7 6,666,667 7,166,667 6 22,000,000 13,15,15.5,16 
 
4.2.20  Rice Varieties offered by the Wholesaler Enterprises 
The sample wholesaler enterprises have provided a list of rice or paddy varieties that they 
have sold during the last one year. The list presents an amazing array of rice varieties that are 
in offer, for example, on an average some 7 rice varieties have been mentioned by each 
sample wholesaler. Taking into consideration common names across enterprises, we find that 
a total of 177 numbers of varieties of rice have been listed by the sample 116 wholesalers. 
Out of the total of 177 varieties, 69 varieties have been listed as Aman varieties, 97 as Boro 
varieties, 3 as Aus varieties and the remaining 8 as common for two crop seasons. We find 
that Boro season offers more diversified varieties in the rice market as compared to the Aman 
season.  
Rice varieties in the Aman season includes names such as BR 30, Chinigura, Govindabhog, 
Guti, Heera, Kataribhog, Sharna, Najirshail, Paijam, Ranjit, etc. On the other hand, rice 
varieties in the Boro season includes names such as BR 11, BR 28, BR 32, Jirashail, Miniket, 
Pari, Chandina, Baashfuli, Hybrid Heera, Parija, etc. The varieties that have been listed as 
Aus season varieties are Borshali Paijira, Sharna Thin, Chinese, etc. This amazing list of 
varieties imply that it is quite difficult for an economic agent in the rice market to be well 
informed about all the fine details and be able to bargain with the other agents on that basis. 
In a market like this where quality and product characteristics vary this much, bargaining of 
price within some ranges is expected since every agent may not have the same opinion about 
a particular variety and therefore their willingness-to-pay will differ. At the same time, it is 
also possible that agents may not have the same knowledge about the varieties in question. In 
an informal setting like Bangladeshi rice markets, we can expect widespread bargain among 
agents on the valuation of rice varieties and our survey findings match this assessment. 
With regards to major sources of supply of rice varieties, we obtain a list of names of districts 
that includes most prominently nearly all the districts in the northern divisions of Rajshahi 
and Rangpur. Some varieties have been originated outside the country, such as countries like 
Myanmar and Pakistan. On the other hand, with regards to major sources of destinations of 
rice varieties, the capital city of Dhaka and its surrounding districts, the port city of 
Chittagong, Sylhet, Khulna, Barisal, Comilla are mentioned. We find a dominant pattern in 
the market, the most prominent route of rice is origin in North Bengal and end in Dhaka or 
Chittagong. Yet there are large number of other competing routes, none is as dominant as this 
one. 
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Rice wholesale enterprises have reported that May, June, July, December and January are the 
months in which the market is particularly active, whereas the market is less active in other 
months of the year. 
4.2.21  Price Movements of Rice Varieties of the Wholesaler Enterprises  
The sample enterprises have been asked to recall the price movements of rice varieties that 
they sold in their respective enterprises throughout the last one year. We find some 
interesting features of the data. First, prices of the same variety do not differ much across the 
entire country. Taking into account the common rice variety of BR 28, we find that 
differences in prices across the country do not exceed Tk. 7.5 for an average value of Tk. 38. 
Taking another example, of Miniket, the price differences across the country did not ever 
exceed Tk. 8.6 for an average value of Tk. 48 (Table 12). Second, prices differ not only 
across the markets, but also within the same market. Even a small market like Dupchanchiya 
has exhibited price differences across enterprises for the same variety of rice, and in some 
cases this difference is more marked compared to differences of average prices across the 
country. We therefore note that wholesale enterprises of a small market did not offer the same 
price for the same variety of rice. 
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Table 12 
Price Movements of Selected Rice Varieties across the Country  
(May 2010 to April 2011)  
Rice Variety: BR 28 
District 
May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 
2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 
Average 31.24 31.75 32.77 33.32 34.38 34.92 35.97 37.08 38.14 38.70 39.13 37.80 
Bogra 34.06 34.88 36.50 37.75 38.25 38.56 39.94 40.69 41.76 41.39 40.64 35.47 
Chitt 30.83 31.00 31.33 31.83 32.50 33.00 33.50 34.17 35.00 35.83 36.50 36.33 
Dhaka 31.76 32.33 33.05 33.67 34.29 34.81 35.67 36.62 37.52 38.00 38.71 39.60 
Dinaj 31.40 30.80 32.60 31.85 35.15 34.30 35.40 37.22 38.11 38.78 39.56 38.89 
Jessore 32.06 34.19 34.89 36.14 36.69 37.78 38.83 39.94 40.67 40.33 40.72 38.83 
Kushtia 28.13 28.63 29.50 30.31 31.06 32.81 34.13 35.50 37.00 38.81 39.56 38.38 
Naogaon 30.44 30.44 31.50 31.67 32.75 33.17 34.33 35.42 36.92 37.75 38.25 37.08 
Rice Variety: Miniket 
Average 34.32 34.92 35.70 36.92 38.10 39.02 40.32 41.85 43.21 44.36 45.38 44.06 
Bogra 37.20 37.60 39.00 39.80 41.00 42.20 42.90 43.90 44.58 45.18 45.18 39.60 
Chitt 33.27 33.55 34.00 34.45 35.41 35.95 36.91 37.86 38.91 39.64 40.80 40.60 
Dhaka 37.25 37.83 39.00 40.08 41.00 41.88 43.67 44.92 46.30 46.30 47.13 46.38 
Dinaj 35.00 35.86 36.43 38.14 40.43 40.86 42.14 45.00 45.33 46.67 47.50 48.17 
Jessore 32.26 32.63 33.82 35.42 36.29 37.50 38.21 38.74 40.79 42.16 45.03 44.11 
Kushtia 31.81 33.14 33.19 34.81 35.81 37.00 39.14 41.00 42.29 43.52 45.48 44.48 
Naogaon 33.45 33.83 34.50 35.75 36.75 37.75 39.25 41.50 44.25 47.05 46.55 45.06 
Rice Variety: BR 28, Market: Dupchanchiya (Bogra) 
 
May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. 
 
2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 
Average 34.06 34.88 36.50 37.75 38.25 38.56 39.94 40.69 41.76 41.39 40.64 35.47 
Stdev 2.86 2.59 2.27 2.43 2.55 2.48 3.72 4.29 3.91 3.69 4.49 2.11 
Max 39.00 39.00 40.00 40.00 41.00 41.00 45.00 46.00 46.00 46.00 47.00 38.00 
Min 30.00 30.00 33.00 34.00 34.00 34.50 34.50 34.50 36.00 36.00 35.00 32.15 
Range 9.00 9.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 6.50 10.50 11.50 10.00 10.00 12.00 5.85 
Note: 
  
highest price 
  
lowest price Figures are in Taka per kg of rice 
 
We now examine price movements of the wholesaler enterprises with respect to the size of 
enterprises, such as “large”, “medium” and “small” (this classification is based on the sample 
enterprises’ assessment of their respective size compared to the other rice enterprises within 
the same market). For example, we take the case of one common variety, BR 28. We find that 
within the same market there is some tendency for prices to move together across size of 
enterprise. One pattern that is found is that prices of “large” and “medium” enterprises in 
general slightly exceeds the prices settled by “small” enterprises, for the same variety of rice 
and within the same rice wholesale market. In other words the “small” enterprises generally 
closely follow prices quoted by the “large” and “medium” enterprises, but they often settle 
for a slightly lower price compared to the “large” and “medium” ones. This can be interpreted 
as follows: the “small” enterprises take into consideration price being quoted by the larger 
enterprises, and yet settle for a reduced price. This is plausible since “small” enterprises do 
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not have the same amount of reputation and do not possess the same amount of bargaining 
power as compared to the larger ones. Therefore there is higher amount of riskiness involved 
on behalf of the counterpart business enterprise when business is being conducted with a 
“small” enterprise rather than a “large” or “medium” enterprise, the riskiness being in terms 
of authenticity of quality of rice being supplied (by the “small” one). Another disadvantage 
that “small” enterprises have is that they may only be able to supply a smaller amount in total 
whereas larger enterprises can supply a much larger amount. A third factor that may work 
against the “small” enterprises is that they may have lesser number of contacts or references 
and thereby may have to take a discount in terms of price quotations. Summing this up, 
“small” enterprises may have lower bargaining power in the market and this result in their 
accepting discounts for sale (in Figure 9, we exhibit the graphs of price movements of BR 
rice, other varieties exhibit similar pattern). 
Imported varieties of rice are presently quite uncommon in the market, and only in the 
Chittagong area we find mention of the imported varieties. The imported varieties available 
in the Chittagong market include names such as Burma Beti, Burma Atap, Pakistan Beti, 
Pakistan Atap, Thailand Beti, Vietnam Beti, etc. We find that “small” enterprises have a 
tendency to follow “medium” enterprises’ prices in the case of imported varieties (Figure 10). 
4.2.22  Profitability of the Wholesaler Enterprises 
In the wholesaler enterprise module, we have collected enterprises’ own reports of their 
respective monthly average profits. We estimate an OLS regression (with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors) of natural log of the monthly average profits as reported by the 
enterprises on enterprise size and area specifications as well as number of enterprises in the 
rice wholesale market. We take “small” enterprises as base for dummies of “large” and 
“medium” enterprises, and enterprises in Dhaka area as base for the area dummies (see Table 
13 in Appendix 2).  
We find that the estimated coefficient for number of enterprises (in the wholesale market) not 
statistically significant (p-value=0.58), this implies, controlling for other variables, entry of a 
new enterprise does not statistically significantly affect growth of the enterprises’ monthly 
profits (self-reported). This implies that the rice wholesale market can still absorb some 
additional enterprises without adversely affecting profitability of the existing enterprises. We 
find that the estimated regression coefficient of area dummy for Kushtia enterprises is 
statistically positively significant (p-value=0.00). This implies that, controlling for size and 
number of enterprises, only Kushtia enterprises tend to have statistically significant higher 
amount of monthly profits compared to the Dhaka enterprises, whilst enterprises in other 
areas do not show any such clear difference. This result matches with findings in other 
sections of the module where Kushtia enterprises are often found to exhibit different results 
compared to those of other areas. We note that we have a mix of millers and wholesalers and 
also enterprises in dual roles of being millers and wholesalers as well as commission agents 
in the Kushtia area. A statistically significant result only for Kushtia location may have the 
implication that within the rice wholesale market structure, enterprises that operate as a mix 
of millers and wholesalers/commission agents have a tendency to exhibit higher growth rate 
of profits. Other than Kushtia locations, amount of profits are not much statistically 
significantly different as compared to the base of Dhaka throughout the country. We exhibit 
results of a joint significance test, and we find the area dummies jointly are statistically 
significant at least at 5% level (p-value of F-test=0.02).  
We find that both the estimated coefficients for size of enterprise dummies such as “large” 
and “medium” are statistically positively significant as compared to the base of “small” 
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enterprises, controlling for other variables in the model. A statistically significant result is 
also found in the joint significant tests for “large” and “medium” enterprises. This implies 
that controlling for other variables in our regression model, the growth of (self-reported) 
average monthly profits have a tendency to be higher for large and medium enterprises as 
compared to those of small enterprises. We can infer from this result that large and medium 
enterprises are more efficient and have a tendency to exhibit faster amount of profit growth as 
compared to the small ones. This indicates that there are some economies of scale in the rice 
wholesale sub-section of the rice market (more prominent in the cases where millers and 
wholesalers overlap in their operations). This does not match with a classic textbook 
(constant-returns to scale) interpretation of the market while this matches with our 
observation from the field that size actually matters and being large is considered good for 
obtaining higher growth rates of profits. Here we have used enterprises’ self-reported profit 
amounts as some arguably reasonable proxy for their true profit amounts since the true 
amount is not available for us. Our model also included enterprise-specific variables such as 
storage capacity (p-value at 0.12), years of operation, the total number of staff and number of 
business contacts with millers—controlling for other variables, these variables did not exhibit 
statistical significance at least at the 10% level.   
4.2.23  Pricing Decisions as Reported by the Wholesaler Enterprises 
Sample wholesalers have reported that prices are decided on the basis of bargaining among 
wholesalers or wholesalers and millers; this bargaining is based on market prices and quality 
characteristics of rice varieties. Within the rice market value chain, there are two major points 
of bargaining, one is the point of the farmer vis-à-vis the bepari (on behalf of the miller) for 
procurement of paddy, and the other is the point of the wholesaler where the wholesaler 
settles prices in between the miller and the end-point wholesaler. We therefore find that the 
miller is involved in both of the points of bargaining.  
If we examine the motivations of millers in the case of the first point of bargaining (point 
where the farmer meets the bepari who acts as an agent of the miller), we understand that the 
miller tries to ensure his procurement of paddy for the lowest possible price that he can 
bargain for, and in this act he sometimes takes help from the bepari with whom he aligns his 
incentives. On the other side of the bargain, the motivation of the farmer is to obtain as high a 
price as possible for his paddy from the bepari. Since the farmer needs to sell paddy and 
bepari needs to purchase it, both of the parties of the bargaining process have an incentive to 
come to some mutually agreeable solution that will make both sides happy unless there is 
some pressing need of some party which will make the case weak for him. Another issue is 
the number of the interested parties involved and how much market power the agents have in 
the market. If farmer has no credit or cash constraint and no pressing need to sell paddy 
urgently and do not have any attached credit previously incurred for the paddy, he can opt for 
the best possible price from among the set of prices that is being offered by the interested 
beparis. Or alternatively the farmer can refuse all of the beparis and sell his paddy in the 
neighboring market. In this scenario the market power lies with the farmers, not with the 
beparis. On the other hand, a farmer who only knows only one bepari, for example, and no 
other alternative but to sell the paddy to the bepari, exhibits low amount of market power. 
This kind of situation can also happen when farmer is hard pressed to sell the paddy to 
service some outstanding loans or do not have storage facilities to store paddy for long.  
In the second major point of bargaining, wholesaler or commission agent is in between the 
miller on the one hand and the end-point wholesaler on the other hand. The commission agent 
bargains with the agents of the end-point wholesaler regarding pricing of some particular 
variety of rice, this bargain is set by miller’s minimum quotation on the one hand and the 
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maximum that the counterpart agent wants to offer for the requested supply. The commission 
agent’s fee is fixed, thereby a good bargain brings in higher revenue for the miller, and a bad 
bargaining results in lower amount of revenue for the same. A commission agent’s reputation 
depends on how successfully he can make good bargains on behalf of the miller. Since this is 
not at all a one-time play, a business relationship between a miller and a commission agent is 
expected to last for long many years, commission agent’s making a bad bargain may result in 
loss of this relationship, and this obviously a commission agent would want to avoid. A 
miller may have business relationships with many number of agents located in many different 
places, therefore he may switch from one commission agent to another within the same 
market, or switch to some other agent in a different market, or may decide to wait and see 
rather than agreeing with any agent at the current moment. Since the rice wholesale market 
has become heavily interconnected, a miller has by now a large number of options as 
commission agents and rice market centers. Therefore a miller in a North Bengal market such 
as Naogaon can compare prices offered by Dhaka market wholesalers with that of Chittagong 
market or of Sylhet market. Any small differences in offers may result in rice supply being 
directed to Sylhet rather than Chittagong, or Barisal rather than Khulna. This is the situation 
when the miller can exercise quite a bit of control over the price bargains because of his large 
number of business contacts. On the other hand, the situation for the miller can be 
unfavorable if he faces tough counterparts in the markets, such that some Dhaka retail 
wholesaler decides to bring supply from millers located in Naogaon market rather than those 
located in Kushtia market. We therefore find that in both of these bargaining process, the 
number of options available matter (along with option to wait or be able to refuse supply, 
implying availability of storage and storage cost), and ultimately this is the relative market 
power of the parties involved that decides the prices at these points. 
4.2.24   Market Structure of the Wholesaler Market 
Why Some Firms May Become Dominant? 
As we investigate the rice wholesaler markets in detail, we find that the small market centers 
are often dominated by a number of “large” firms. Why do some firms become “large”, while 
others do not? In other words, why do some firms gain substantial market power, while 
others do not? As per Carlton and Perloff (2000), there are at least three possible reasons that 
are sufficient to create a dominant firm-competitive fringe market structure:  
The first reason is that dominant firms may have lower costs than fringe firms. Four major 
causes of lower costs are: (a) the firm may be more efficient than others (better management 
or better technology), (b) an early entrant to a market may have lower costs from having 
learned by experience how to produce more efficiently, (c) an early entrant may have had 
time to grow large optimally (in the presence of adjustment costs) so as to benefit from 
economies of scale, and (d) the government may favor the original firm in terms of tax rates 
or other benefits.   
The second reason is that a dominant firm may have a superior product in a market where 
each firm produces a differentiated product. This superiority may be due to a reputation 
achieved through advertising or through goodwill generated by its having been in the market 
longer.  
The third reason is that a group of firm may collectively act as a dominant firm. Groups of 
firms in a market may have incentive to coordinate their activities to increase their profits. A 
group of firms that explicitly acts collectively to promote its best interest is called a cartel. If 
all firms in a market coordinate their activities, then the cartel is effectively a monopoly; if 
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only some of them do so, then the group acts as a dominant firm facing a competitive fringe 
of non-cooperating firms (op. cit. (2000).  
A Dominant Firm Oligopoly Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry 
The dominant firm cannot set a high price when entry is unlimited, compared to when entry 
is restricted. One crucial assumption of the model is that an unlimited number of competitive-
fringe firms may enter the market as long as they make positive profits.  
The implication of the model is that fringe firms cannot make profits in the long run; either 
they make zero profits or have exited out of the industry. Assuming that fringe firms are all 
identical in costs, the market price cannot go higher than a fringe firm’s minimum average 
cost, so that fringe firms always only make zero economic profits. The explanation is that, if 
there is some way that fringe firms make positive economic profits, more firms would flood 
into the market and drive price down to levels where each firm earns zero economic profits. 
On the other hand, since the dominant firm has lower costs than fringe firms, the dominant 
firm makes positive economic profits.  
Price Umbrella 
The model is sometimes placed in such a way that a dominant firm provides a pricing 
umbrella for smaller firms. As long as competing firms price at or below the level of the 
dominant firm, they will be able to find buyers. If the products they offer are considered 
inferior (for example, the firms lack established reputation or they are unable to provide a 
large supply at a time), the fringe firms have to set their prices substantially below those of 
the dominant firms. 
Equilibrium Determination in the Market with a Dominant Firm and Free Entry of Fringe   
Even with unlimited entry of fringe firms, the dominant firm can gain and hold indefinitely a 
large share of the market if it has some cost or other advantage. This may happen since the 
dominant firm may have superior products, superior and more numerous (business) contacts, 
or has generated goodwill with buyers and other business counterparts.  
As more and more competitive-fringe firms enter (n rises), the slope of the competitive-fringe 
supply curve becomes flatter and flatter (it is n times the slope of a typical firm’s supply, or 
marginal cost, MC, curve). As the number of firms grows large, the fringe’s supply curve 
becomes horizontal, say, at price p* (as long as price is at least p*, the competitive fringe is 
capable of and is willing to supply any quantity that market demands), so the corresponding 
marginal revenue curve is also flat. Below p*, the residual demand curve is the market 
demand, which slopes downward. Again, the marginal revenue curve corresponding to the 
residual demand curve jumps at the quantity where the kink in the residual demand curve 
slopes downward.  
There are two possible equilibria. First, if the dominant firm’s marginal cost is relatively high 
(MCd in Figure I(B)), so that it intersects the horizontal portion of the MRd curve, the price is 
p*, and the competitive fringe meets some of the market’s demand. At this price, each fringe 
firm makes zero economic profits (since its average cost equals p*) and therefore is 
indifferent between staying in business and leaving the market. The amount to be produced 
by the fringe firms depends on the dominant firm’s cost structure (that is, where MCd 
intersects the horizontal marginal revenue curve), which determines the dominant firm’s 
output, Qd (the fringe firms produce an output, Qf = Q   ̶ Qd). To note that, it is possible that 
Qf = 0 even though the presence of the fringe constrains price to equal p*. Thus, if fringe 
firms flood into a market whenever positive profits can be made, the dominant firm cannot 
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charge a price above the minimum average cost of a fringe firm. Whereas a dominant-firm 
can still make positive profits, competitive-fringe firms just break even.  
The second type of equilibrium happens if the dominant firm’s marginal cost is lower (MCd* 
in Figure I(B)), so this intersects with the marginal revenue curve in the downward-sloping 
portion of the residual market demand curve. Here price is so low that no fringe firm stays in 
the industry and the dominant firm acts as a monopoly.  
Our discussion of the rice wholesaler market closely matches with the equilibrium price and 
output determination model of a dominant firm with a competitive-fringe with free entry and 
exits (Figure I(B), the first equilibrium) and where dominant firm produces output side-by-
side the competitive fringe firms (neither is able to drive the other out of industry). The 
dominant firm provides an indicative price in the industry which we can associate with the 
phenomenon of the price umbrella. The dominant firm (or a group of larger-size firms acting 
as a dominant firm) still holds on to a large share of the market, and this share does not 
change much over time. On the other hand, there are a number of cases of entry and exit in 
the market, more particularly among those firms which are on the fringe. The cost advantage 
of the dominant firm (of firms) may arise from superior products (may be real or simply 
perceived), larger business networks, greater and older reputation, therefore having been able 
to generate more trust (reduces prospect of default or expectation of cheating). We can 
conclude that, provided examination of the information as discussed in the previous sections, 
the rice wholesaler market functions as a dominant firm oligopoly constrained by the 
presence of a competitive-fringe with free entry into and exit from the industry.  
 
Figure I. Equilibrium Price and Output in a Dominant Firm Model with Competitive 
Fringe and Unlimited Entry 
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4.3  The Retailer Market  
4.3.1  Examining the State of Competitiveness in the Market for Retailers 
In order to investigate the state of competitiveness in the rice retailer markets, we outline 
some basic features or testable implications that are expected to be present in this market. 
First we point out that a competitive market is one which contains a large number of buyers 
and sellers. The retailer market covers a large number of buyers and sellers; thus we do not 
find problems with this condition. Second we can expect free entry and exit of firms into this 
market. We find that even though it is not prohibitively expensive to enter into retailer 
market, usually this requires long “training” in the form of experiences of operations within 
this market for long periods of time. As was the case of enterprises in the rice wholesaler 
market, enterprises in the rice retailer markets requires business connections which takes long 
time to build. Thus we find that entry into this market to some extent is restricted in the form 
of entry barriers such as requirements for experiences and business connections.  
4.3.2  Findings from the Selected Retailer Markets 
The primary survey covered a total of 21 retailers in the two end-point retailer locations, 
Dhaka and Chittagong. Out of these, ten retailers were interviewed in the Chittagong City 
Corporation area and eleven were interviewed in Dhaka City Corporation area (four from 
Babubazaar aka Badamtoli, three from Kochukhet and the remaining four from 
Mohammadpur Krishi Market).  
The markets for retailers varied over different markets, typically these market locations 
covered 15 to 20 enterprises (the largest one among them is the Dhaka Kochukhet market 
with around 50 enterprises). Out of the total 21 retailers surveyed, 10 categorized themselves 
as being “medium” sized, 3 as “large” and the remaining 8 as “small” sized as compared to 
other enterprises in those particular retailer markets. All the surveyed retailers are located on 
the main road or within half a kilometer distance from the main road. Retailer enterprises are 
most often single-owned entities, with only some exceptions in the Chittagong areas. Without 
any exception, the owners of the surveyed retailers are all males. It is absolutely rare to find 
any female entrepreneur to have ownership over the rice market enterprises in the entire 
country, be it milling, or wholesale or retail. The average age of the surveyed retailers is 42 
years, with ranges between 30 to 50 years. On an average, the owners of the surveyed 
enterprises have nine years of formal education. At the same time, the owners on an average 
have nine years of experiences in the rice market, whilst the maximum value is up to 29 
years.   
Retailers are small in operations, most often there are only two full-time employees besides 
the owner-manager. Most of the surveyed retailers only have some office space, measuring 
around 9 feet in length and 7 feet in width. Only few retailers have storage spaces. We can 
infer that retailers mostly concentrate on delivering the output at the ongoing market prices, 
rather than keeping it for some time. None of the retailer enterprises have any vehicle. And 
none of them have any branch offices. Most of the retailers have been established by the 
owners themselves, and some others have been inherited. On an average, the surveyed 
retailers are in operation for the last ten years, while the oldest among them has been in 
operation for thirty years.   
The markets for retailers varied over different markets, typically these market locations 
covered 15 to 20 enterprises (the largest one among them is the Dhaka Kochukhet market 
with around 50 enterprises). Out of the total 21 retailers surveyed, 10 categorized themselves 
as being “medium” sized, 3 as “large” and the remaining 8 as “small” sized as compared to 
other enterprises in those particular retailer markets. All the surveyed retailers are located on 
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the main road or within half a kilometer distance from the main road. Retailer enterprises are 
most often single-owned entities, with only some exceptions in the Chittagong areas. Without 
any exception, the owners of the surveyed retailers are all males. It is absolutely rare to find 
any female entrepreneur to have ownership over the rice market enterprises in the entire 
country, be it milling, or wholesale or retail. The average age of the surveyed retailers is 42 
years, with ranges between 30 to 50 years. On an average, the owners of the surveyed 
enterprises have nine years of formal education. At the same time, the owners on an average 
have nine years of experiences in the rice market, whilst the maximum value is up to 29 
years.   
Retailers are small in operations, most often there are only two full-time employees besides 
the owner-manager. Most of the surveyed retailers only have some office space, measuring 
around 9 feet in length and 7 feet in width. Only few retailers have storage spaces. We can 
infer that retailers mostly concentrate on delivering the output at the ongoing market prices, 
rather than keeping it for some time. None of the retailer enterprises have any vehicle. And 
none of them have any branch offices. Most of the retailers have been established by the 
owners themselves, and some others have been inherited. On an average, the surveyed retailer 
enterprises are in operation for the last ten years, while the oldest among them has been in 
operation for thirty years.  The average expenses incurred for establishing an enterprise has 
been around Taka 0.36 million, while the median value is Taka 0.2 million (lower amount 
compared to the case of the rice wholesalers). The major portion of this financing has come 
from the owner’s own savings from non-agricultural activities. Other sources of initial 
financing are loans from NGO/microfinance institutions, sale of assets, informal loans from 
family and friends, etc.  
Retailers have lesser number of business contacts as compared to the wholesalers. On an 
average, the surveyed retailer has business contacts with 7 local wholesalers, 5 local retailers 
and 50 local customers. Almost all of these contacts are within the same locality, this implies 
retailers simply obtain the produce from the wholesalers and deliver those within the locality 
among the customers. They do not have long-distance networks as it is often the case with the 
wholesalers. With regards to financing of working capital, retailers mostly depend on private 
commercial banks, followed by family or friends. On an average, a retailer enterprise expects 
to be able to generate Taka 0.7 million for working capital or business expansion 
requirements from these financing sources.  
Retailers of Chittagong and Dhaka receive rice from different districts, more prominently 
from northern districts of Bogra, Naogaon, Dinajpur, and western district of Kushtia. Since 
they reported limited business contacts with distant districts, they depend on the immediate 
wholesaler to deliver the rice from those districts.  Retailers pass more active business 
seasons during May to August and again during December to February, this is simply a one-
month lag time frame as compared to that of the wholesalers.     
4.3.3  Pricing and Bargaining as Reported by the Retailer Enterprises 
The retailer enterprises report that they simply pass the wholesale prices on to the customers 
with some pre-fixed amounts of profit margins. The common practice is that they obtain their 
supply from the wholesale market at the ongoing (wholesale) market price, and then add 
Taka 25 or 30 per 50-kg bag of rice and sell it to the customers. How much to add to the 
wholesale market price is a common understanding reached among the retailers themselves 
prior to transactions. The retailers meet two categories of business counterparts in price 
bargaining. First category is the rice wholesalers who would supply rice to them at the 
ongoing rice market wholesale price. Second category is the rice customers who would check 
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with other enterprises and see if price could be any lower anywhere for the same variety, 
quality, specification, etc. The prominent presence of the rice customers at the end of the rice 
market supply chain makes sure that the retailer enterprises need to be watchful not to ask for 
“too high” a price that would scare away the customers, and again not to ask for “too low” a 
price which would reduce their own profit margin (the other group, the wholesalers, would 
want to have as high a wholesale price as possible). Since the retailers do not have any 
storage space, most often their role would be to just offload the rice produce on to the 
customers. In between two markets prices, one that of retail market, and the other of 
wholesale market-- the retailers have their profit margins (and costs of value addition for the 
retailers). Because of the presence of the customer group on the one hand and the wholesaler 
group on the other, the retailers do not have much influence on the directions of the market 
prices.      
4.4 Summary of the Primary Survey Findings 
We discuss here some concluding points from our survey findings. Firstly, the private import 
of rice has been very minimal during the last three years, and as such private importers were 
not interested to import since the gap between domestic prices and international prices have 
not been large enough to make import profitable. Only in this year there are some 
preparations for public import of rice. Therefore the recent price increases in the domestic 
market in recent times is mostly a domestic phenomenon, based on domestic demand and 
supply situations.  
Second, rice market contains a large network of intermediaries from the beginning point of 
the farmer to the end point of the consumer. Whereas there are millions of rice farmers at the 
one end and millions of consumers at the other, the numbers of economic agents in the 
intermediate steps are not very large, and these intermediaries differ among themselves in 
terms of their respective roles, objectives, skill and expertise, technical support, constraints, 
strategies, etc. The intermediaries interact with each other and often bargain with each other, 
who are striving for securing his or her self-interests. Almost all the contracts within this 
market are informal, in the form of verbal or mobile phone conversation or hand-written 
notes. In this environment, “trust” and “reputation” are important themes and the firm aims to 
achieve these over time, since firms who enter into this market ends up operating here for 
long many years. On the other hand, default risk is quite high in this kind of environment and 
default of one of the transacting parties is cited as one major cause of exit of firms from this 
industry.  Even though the entry cost into this industry is not prohibitively high, the issue of 
default risk, trust and reputation, skill and expertise and correct knowledge of the business 
partners are essential requirements to survive and these are steep entry barriers.  
Third, within the rice market value chain, there are two points where major bargaining takes 
place; one is between the farmer and the bepari or faria (often as agents of the miller) over 
the price and quantity of paddy, and the other is between the rice market wholesaler or 
commission agent (as agent of the miller) and the end-point wholesale or retail wholesaler 
over the price, quantity and quality combination of rice. The rice miller is present directly or 
indirectly in both of these bargaining processes, and at the same time, he has storage capacity 
to postpone sell of stock for some time. This implies that millers or miller-cum-wholesalers 
have potentials to enjoy large leverage over the entire rice market value chain.  
Fourth, the rice market has become heavily interconnected except for the case of the farmers 
who may have limited number of contacts and limited options other than sell at the price 
offered from the miller. The interconnectedness of the rice market has been strengthened by 
rapid expansion of mobile phone technology, road transport and construction of bridges, i.e., 
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Jamuna Bridge. A miller-cum-wholesaler in a small rice market in North Bengal may have 
business contacts with wholesalers of an opposite corner of the country, for example, Cox’s 
Bazaar, or Sylhet, and therefore now enjoys large number of options to choose from to decide 
where to supply his rice. Therefore every area in the country is in a way competing with each 
other to procure rice at the minimum cost and at the same time supply rice at the highest 
possible price. In this kind of an active market, a small difference in price offers may result in 
loss of business transactions, or even goodwill of counterparts. Such an intense competition 
over the entire geographical space of the country implies that it is very difficult for anyone to 
gain excessively compared to what others are gaining. The market does not have any single 
agent, who is indispensable. For example, even though millers of one location may enjoy 
large bargaining power, they may not be able to gain excessive profits either since they have 
to compete with millers from other locations as well, besides competing with each other.  
Fifth, regression results from survey data of sample enterprises’ self-reported profits exhibit 
large and medium-sized enterprises in the rice wholesale markets enjoy higher amount of 
profit growth as compared to small-sized enterprises. This indicates large and medium-sized 
enterprises enjoy economies of scale in their operations whereas small ones do not. The 
regression results also suggest that enterprises that have combined operations of millers and 
wholesalers/commission agents enjoy higher amounts as compared to the ones who are only 
wholesalers.  
Sixth, price that is finally settled in any bargaining process within the rice market value chain 
depends on relative bargaining power of the concerned parties. Anyone who has better 
bargaining power enjoys the privilege of setting the range within which bargaining may take 
place, and the other party who has lower bargaining power may have to accept some price 
within that specified range. One clear case of lack of bargaining power is evident in our 
survey responses from some North Bengal small farmers. The farmers have reported that they 
have to accept prices set by the bepari since they lack storage space, need money for family 
expenses or repay outstanding loans. On the other hand, high bargaining power is enjoyed by 
miller-wholesalers in Kushtia, who can ask for the best price anywhere in the country or 
postpone sell.  
Seventh, within the rice wholesale market, the enterprises are free to sell any amount at any 
price they can obtain, whereas each of them is concerned about prices of neighboring 
enterprises. Large and medium enterprises enjoy the advantage of setting the trend of prices 
in the market, and the rest small ones follow them. The small ones’ prices are often found to 
be slightly lower for the same variety of rice, since they have to give discounts to compensate 
for the risks involved in dealing with them, particularly authenticity of quality of rice variety 
and lack of references. We therefore find prices of a variety of rice offered by all the 
enterprises to move together, whereas small enterprises sell the same at a slightly lower price. 
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SECTION 5 
TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICES OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL  
VARIETIES OF RICE 
This section analyzes the trends in prices for local and international varieties of rice. In 
addition, the relationship between local and international prices is also explored. Seven 
domestic varieties of rice and five international varieties have been taken for analysis based 
on relevance. The dataset used consists of monthly price data of the different varieties for the 
period of 1997-2007. 
Volatility in rice prices has been observed in recent years while rice prices have gone up both 
locally and internationally. For analyzing trends in rice prices, we consider both nominal and 
real prices (adjusted for inflation using non-food price index). Our price data consists of 
monthly nominal wholesale prices of different varieties of local rice as well as f.o.b. prices of 
several international varieties (Thai 5% broken, parboiled, Thai 25%, India’s 25%, and Viet 
25%). The domestic wholesale price data were collected from DAM and international export 
prices from the published FAO data, for the period of 1997 to 2007. Due to data 
unavailability in some months, linear interpolation was utilized and in other cases, yearly 
averages were taken as monthly prices. All prices were later converted to Taka per quintal for 
comparability. 
Figure 11 to Figure 17 will give an idea about the price trends of different domestic varieties. 
As observed, there is both upward and downward movement in the price of rice per quintal 
until 2007. We observe similar pattern for both nominal and real prices. However, after 2007, 
rice prices exhibit a clear upward trend increasing over several months. 
In case of international varieties (Thai 5% broken, parboiled, Thai 25%, India’s 25%, and 
Viet 25%) similar trends were observed (Figures 18 to 22). This would suggest that there may 
close relation between both price movements. As one would expect local prices are highly 
integrated with international market in an open economy context. As observed in previous 
studies (e.g. Murshid et al., 2009) increases rice price was not related to domestic production 
per se rather other variables such as international prices, market forces as well as other 
unobservable could affect price increase. This study found some weak market integration 
with local rice price and rice price in Kolkata (capital of West Bengal). We intend to analyze 
this issue further and investigate co-integrating relationship between prices of local varieties 
with several international varieties of rice.  
In order to avoid any spurious relationship, we first investigate the stationarity properties of 
the time series using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). 
The purpose of ‘augmenting’ the Dickey-Fuller (DF) regression is to get white noise errors. A 
series Yt is said to be integrated of order d denoted by Yt∼I(d) if it becomes stationary after 
differencing d times and thus Yt contains d unit roots. A series which is I(0) is said to be 
stationary.  
Table 14 in the appendix shows the results of the ADF test. The results suggest that the null-
hypothesis (H0) of unit root can be rejected in the first difference, I(1) and therefore all the 
series (i.e. domestic and international varieties) are stationary in the first difference. Since the 
all series are clearly stationary in I(1), this suggest that price of  each varieties can be 
integrated of order one. 
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5.1 Cointegration Test 
The Johansen cointegration testing technique is used for the ‘trace’ and ‘maximum 
eigenvalue’ statistics. Results of this test are shown in Table 15 in the appendix. 
Both the ‘trace statistic’ and the ‘eigenvalue statistic’ imply rejection of null hypothesis of r = 
0 (no cointegrating vectors) against the alternative hypothesis r =1 (one co-integrating 
vectors). However, the same for r ≤ 1 against the alternative of r = 2 (two co-integrating 
vectors) cannot be rejected at 5% level of significance. This test, therefore, reaffirms any co-
integrating relation between the variables. 
From the table is clear that India 25% varieties of rice have a strong cointegrating 
relationship with all domestic varieties except Aus-local. On the other hand, Viet 25% has 
cointegration with all the Aman varieties, i.e. coarse, medium, HYV. Aus local has no 
cointegrating relationship with international varieties like Thai 5% Broken, Thai 5% 
Parboiled, Thai 25%, India 25% and Viet 25%. Aus-HYV, Boro-Local and Boro-HYV had 
only one cointegrating relationship and that is with India 25% variety.  The maximum 
cointegrating vectors are found between Aman-coarse and Aman Medium with the 
international varieties. 
Thus above analysis indicate that trends in local and international prices exhibit similar trends 
over the years and in the long-run price movements in local and international markets in most 
cases are integrated. The cointegrating relationship is more pronounced in case of specific 
variety of local and Indian rice. In a revised version of this paper, we intend to investigate 
further on price relationships before drawing specific policy conclusions. 
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SECTION 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We take a broader perspective on the issue of recent price increases in the domestic rice 
market in Bangladesh. We explore the nature of competition at different stages of the 
domestic rice market of Bangladesh by explaining incentives and behaviors of different 
agents in the market, particularly those of large firms operating in the middle of the rice 
market supply chain.  
As observed rice markets contain a large network of intermediaries from the 
beginning point of the farmer to the end point of the consumer. These intermediaries differ in 
terms of their respective sizes, roles, objectives, skill and expertise, technical support, 
constraints, strategies, etc. The intermediaries interact and often bargain with each other, who 
are striving for securing self-interests. Almost all the contracts within this market are 
informal, in the form of verbal or mobile phone conversation or hand-written notes. Here, 
“trust” and “reputation” are important on which  the firm invests overtime to operate in this 
market  for long many years. On the other hand, default risk is seen quite high , which is cited 
as one major cause of exit of firms from the market.  Even though the entry cost is not 
prohibitively high, the issue of default risk, trust and reputation, skill and expertise and 
correct knowledge of the business partners are very essential to survive and hence these can 
be considered as steep entry barriers.  
The rice market has become heavily interconnected except for the case of the farmers. 
, who may have limited number of contacts and limited options other than selling produce  at 
the price offered by a miller. It has been observed that large and medium-sized enterprises 
enjoy greater economies of scale in their operations compared to smaller ones. Within the 
rice market value chain, there are two points where major bargaining takes place; one is 
between the farmer and the bepari or faria (often as agents of the miller) over the price and 
quantity of paddy, and the other is between the rice market wholesaler or commission agent 
(as agent of the miller) and the end-point wholesale or retail wholesaler over the price, 
quantity and quality combination of rice. The presence of rice miller,  in both of these 
bargaining processes is observed, who by taking advantage of  storage capacity is able to 
postpone sale  at least for some period. This implies that millers or miller-cum-wholesalers 
have potentials to enjoy large leverage over the entire rice market value chain and thus 
potentially engage in opportunistic behavior within the market. Price determination process 
within the rice market value chain depends on relative bargaining power of the concerned 
parties. Large and medium enterprises enjoy the advantage of setting prices in the market, 
and the rest small ones follow them. We therefore find prices of a variety of rice offered by 
all the enterprises to move together, whereas small enterprises sell the same at a slightly 
lower price. Additionally, within the rice wholesale market, the enterprises are free to sell any 
amount at any price they can obtain, whereas each of them is concerned about prices of 
neighboring enterprises. 
We also examined price trends of local and international varieties of rice. Both 
nominal and real prices show upward and downward movements during 1997 to 2007 period 
with persistently upward trend in the last periods of investigation. In case of international 
varieties similar trends were observed suggesting integration in an open economy context. 
We also observe long term relationship(cointergation) between prices of local varieties with 
several international varieties of rice with between most domestic varieties and India 25% 
variety, which is consistent as historically during the period of study major rice imports were 
from India. However, as in the recent years private imports of rice were virtually not 
happening in our context suggesting that the recent price divergences could only be explained 
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through local market dynamics and agents behaviors and we make an exploratory attempt in 
this regard.  
In terms of discussion of market structure, we find that the rice wholesaler market is 
characterized by a model of the dominant firm oligopoly with competitive-fringe firms with 
free, instantaneous entry and exit. The larger wholesaler firms provide a price umbrella for 
the smaller firms whom we can consider as competitive, fringe firms. The status of 
dominance by one firm (or a group of firms acting as a single firm by way of an implicit 
cartel) may have arisen because of longer established reputation and trust in the market and 
real or perceived superior quality products and more numerous business contacts.  
We conclude the paper with some observations on the issue of competition in the rice 
markets in Bangladesh based on the above discussion. It is obvious that agents in the market 
interacting with each other pursue different objectives as well as face different constraints in 
their operations. Hence it is appropriate to examine different segments of the rice market 
separately to reach any conclusion regarding market competitiveness. The first segment of 
the rice market, one that involves primary growers, can be considered as to a large extent 
competitive, although the benefits of competition do not reach small and marginal farmers. 
The reason is that the small and marginal farmers often suffer from credit and cash 
constraints, and lack sufficient storage capacities, making them vulnerable to the 
opportunistic behavior of rather powerful intermediaries. As we proceed to the second 
segment of the market, which is of the rice millers and the wholesalers, we find that the issue 
of competition is rather interesting.  Given that an entrepreneur has to have large financial 
resources as well as business connections to be able to survive in the rice wholesaler market, 
entry into this market (segment) is rather difficult. Also default risks of financial transactions 
or delays in payments often serve as an entry deterrent for new potential entrants.  
As observed price bargaining depends on relative economic power and/ or business 
connections of the two agents whereby the more informed and connected agent gains from 
the bargaining process. With regards to price movements of wholesaler firms within the rice 
wholesaler markets we found that large farms’ price quotations are often considered as the 
indicative prices and small and medium sized firms often simply follow this price.  This 
resembles the standard oligopolistic price-leadership phenomenon, where one dominant firm 
sets the prices and the other firms (often smaller) act as follower. Overall, in the second 
segment of the rice market, that of the wholesale markets, one may argue that competition is 
to a large extent restricted. Even though a large number of wholesaler firms operate in the 
market, the ones with more economic resources and business connections dominate.  In the 
case of the third segment (of the retailer firms), this mostly acts as a channel for prices set in 
the second segment (of the rice wholesalers). Our survey findings have implications for 
public policy.  
We cannot however conclude on how the competition (or lack of it) affects the end 
consumers since our study concentrated mostly on the price bargaining and negotiations 
within the primary growers’ segments, wholesalers’ segment and retailers’ segments, we 
specifically did not follow the issue of burden of any opportunistic behaviors on the 
consumers directly. This could be an extension of the present study.    
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APPENDIX 1 
MAPS AND FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 
Surveyed Districts 
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FIGURE 2 
Major sources and destinations of supply of rice in the district of Bogra 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas.  
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FIGURE 3 
Major sources and destinations of supply of rice in the district of Chittagong 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas.  
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FIGURE 4 
Major sources and destinations of supply of rice in the district of Dhaka 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas.  
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FIGURE 5 
Major sources and destinations of supply rice in the district of Dinajpur 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas 
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FIGURE 6 
Major sources and destinations of supply of rice in the district of Jessore 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas 
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FIGURE 7 
Major sources and destinations of supply of rice in the district of Kushtia 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas  
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FIGURE 8 
Major sources and destinations of supply in the district of Naogaon 
 
Note: Blue arrow indicates source areas, and red arrow indicates destination areas 
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FIGURE 9 
Price Movements of Enterprises across the Country for BR 28 Rice, 2010-11 
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FIGURE 10 
Price Movements of Enterprises across the Country for BR 28 Rice, 2010-11(Continued) 
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FIGURE 11 
Trend of Aman – Coarse (Real and Nominal) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12 
Trend of Aman – Medium (Real and Nominal) 
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FIGURE 13 
Trend of Aman – HYV (Real and Nominal) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 14 
Trend of Aus – Local (Real and Nominal) 
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FIGURE 15 
Trend of Aus – HYV (Real and Nominal) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 16 
Trend of Boro – Local (Real and Nominal) 
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FIGURE 17 
Trend of Boro - HYV (Real and Nominal) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 18 
Trend of Thai 5% Broken (Real and Nominal) 
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FIGURE 19 
Trend of Thai 5% Parboiled (Real and Nominal) 
 
 
FIGURE 20 
Trend of Thai 25% (Real and Nominal) 
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FIGURE 21 
Trend of Indian 25% (Real and Nominal) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 22 
Trend of Vietnamese 25% (Real and Nominal) 
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APPENDIX 2 
ECONOMETRIC TEST RESULTS 
 
 
TABLE 13 
OLS Regression of Reported Monthly Profit 
Dependent Variable   
Lnmonthlyprofit natural log of monthly profit reported by the enterprise 
    
Independent Variables   
noofenter number of enterprises (in the rice market) 
large dummy for "large" enterprises 
medium dummy for "medium" enterprises 
storton 
yrsofop 
totnostaff 
nconmillers 
bogra 
storage capacity of the enterprise (in tons) 
years of operation of the enterprise  
total number of staff of the enterprise 
number of millers as business contacts of the enterprise 
dummy for Bogra area markets 
chittagong dummy for enterprises in Chittagong area 
dinajpur dummy for enterprises in Dinajpur area  
jessore dummy for enterprises in Jessore area  
kushtia dummy for enterprises in Kushtia area 
naogaon dummy for enterprises in Naogaon area  
    
 Estimated  Heteroskedasticity-
Robust 
 
Variable Coefficients Standard Error p-value 
noofenter − 0.00 0.00 0.58 
large*** 1.60 0.54 0.00 
medium*** 
storton 
yrsofop 
totnostaff 
nconmiller 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
− 0.02 
0.00 
0.21 
0.00 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.95 
0.49 
0.49 
bogra − 0.40 0.44 0.37 
chittagong 0.05 0.22 0.82 
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dinajpur 0.08 0.33 0.81 
jessore 0.41 0.48 0.40 
kushtia*** 1.95 0.58 0.00 
naogaon − 0.69 0.89 0.45 
constant*** 12.77 0.42 0.00 
    
Number of Observations= 113;  
F(13,99)=  6.36   
Prob>F= 0.00   
R-Squared= 
 Root MSE=   0.91     
       
0.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Joint Significance Tests:    
Null Hypothesis of All Locations Equal to Zero: 
F(6,99)= 2.58   
Prob>F= 0.02   
Null Hypothesis of Large And Medium Equal to Zero:  
F(2,99)= 7.43   
Prob>F= 0.00   
Note. *** implies significance at 1% level, ** implies significance at 5% level and  
          * implies significance at 10% level.  
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TABLE 14 
ADF Test Results 
 
 
 
 
 
Level/ 
First Difference 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller  
Variables (ADF) Test Statistic** Conclusion 
 Without Trend With Trend  
Aman-Coarse 
Level  -2.471   (0) -2.45 (0) 
I (1) 
First Difference  -12.426 (0)* -12.394 (0)* 
Aman-Medium 
Level  -1.483 (0) -1.433 (0) 
I (1) 
First Difference  -11.514(0)* -11.515 (0)* 
Aman-HYV 
Level  -2.454 (0) -2.427 (0) 
I (1) 
First Difference  -12.331 (0)* -12.305 (0)* 
Aus-Local 
Level  -1.50 (0) -2.103 (0) 
I (1) 
First Difference  -11.087(0)* -11.099 (0)* 
Aus-HYV 
Level  -1.707 (0) -2.134(0) I (1) 
First Difference  -10.625  (0)* -10.625 (0)* 
Boro-Local 
Level  -2.136 (0) -2.361(0) I (1) 
First Difference  -11.287 (0)* -11.277 (0)* 
Boro HYV 
Level  -2.43 (0) --2.588 (0) I (1) 
First Difference  -12.172 (0)* -12.162   (0)* 
International Varieties 
Thai 5% Broken 
Level  -1.24(0) -1.638(0) I (1) 
First Difference  -8.151(0)* -8.403 (0)* 
Thai 5% Parboiled 
Level  -0.94(0) -1.002(0) I (1) 
First Difference  -8.038  (0)*   -8.180  (0)* 
Thai 25% 
Level  0.070 (0) -0.587(0) I (1) 
First Difference  -9.267 (0)* -9.603 (0)* 
India 25% 
Level  0.645(0) 0.394 (0) I (1) 
First Difference  -7.550(0)* -8.248 (0)* 
Viet 25% 
Level  -0.447(0) -0.946 (0) I (1) 
First Difference  -10.355 (0)* -10.497 (0)* 
Note: 
In ADF tests, optimum lag lengths, shown in parentheses in the test statistics column. 
‘*’ denote significant at 5 percent level. 
All regression estimations and test results are obtained by using STATA 10.0 econometric software. 
** MacKinnon approximate p-value are used for test statistics. 
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TABLE 15 
Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Test Variables 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Trace Test Maximal Eigen Value Test 
Statistics 
5% critical 
value 
Statistics 5% critical value 
Aman Coarse Vs 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 15.76* 15.41 14.46* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1 3.76 1 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 12.72 15.41 11.85 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.87 3.76 0.87 3.76 
Thai 25% r=0 r=1 15.15* 15.41 13.17* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.98 3.76 1.98 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 18.23* 15.41 16.91* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.32 3.76 1.32 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 18.31* 15.41 17.16* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.15 3.76 1.15 3.76 
Aman-Medium Vs 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 17.44* 15.41 15.42* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.02 3.76 2.02 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 12.87 15.41 10.07 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.8 3.76 2.8 3.76 
Thai 25% r=0 r=1 15.50* 15.41 12.05 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 3.45 3.76 3.45 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 17.34* 15.41 17.31* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.03 3.76 0.03 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 16.59* 15.41 14.49* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.1 3.76 2.1 3.76 
Aman-HYV  Vs 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 17.49* 15.41 16.37* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.12 3.76 1.12 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 13.76 15.41 11.97 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.79 3.76 1.79 3.76 
Thai 25% r=0 r=1 15.03 15.41 11.77 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 3.26 3.76 3.26 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 21.67* 15.41 20.00* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.67 3.76 1.67 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 19.04* 15.41 17.02* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.02 3.76 2.02 3.76 
Aus-Local 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 10.62 15.41 9.39 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.22 3.76 1.22 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 9.92 15.41 8.45 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.48 3.76 1.48 3.76 
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Thai 25% r=0 r=1 12.29 15.41 9.66 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.64 3.76 2.64 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 13.9 15.41 13.8 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.097 3.76 0.097 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 12.35 15.41 10.76 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.58 3.76 1.58 3.76 
Aus-HYV 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 12.86 15.41 11.99 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.87 3.76 0.87 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 11.09 15.41 10.19 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.89 3.76 0.89 3.76 
Thai 25% r=0 r=1 13.93 15.41 11.33 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.6 3.76 2.6 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 17.94* 15.41 16.48* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.46 3.76 1.46 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 12.29 15.41 10.14 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.14 3.76 2.14 3.76 
Boro-Local 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 12.22 15.41 11.9 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.31 3.76 0.31 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 11.42 15.41 10.59 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.82 3.76 0.82 3.76 
Thai 25% r=0 r=1 13.03 15.41 11.07 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.98 3.76 1.98 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 15.41* 15.41 14.83* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.58 3.76 0.58 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 13.6 15.41 13.13 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.48 3.76 0.48 3.76 
Boro-HYV 
Thai 5% Broken r=0 r=1 13.11 15.41 12.95 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 0.15 3.76 0.15 3.76 
Thai 5% Parboiled r=0 r=1 11.6 15.41 10.59 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.01 3.76 1.01 3.76 
Thai 25% r=0 r=1 14.96 15.41 11.96 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.99 3.76 2.99 3.76 
India 25% r=0 r=1 17.49* 15.41 16.36* 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 1.12 3.76 1.12 3.76 
Viet 25% r=0 r=1 14.92 15.41 12.57 14.07 
  r≤1 r=2 2.34 3.76 2.3 3.76 
Note:‘r’ implies the number of cointegrating vectors 
* reject null hypothesis at 5% level of significance. 
Osterwald-Lenum Critical values are used for test statistics
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